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Recently the number of insecure workers has continuously increased in the 
post-industrial labour market. Given the situation, this dissertation examines 
insecure workers’ memberships of trade unions, which are a traditional 
political agency for workers, and their attitudes towards new welfare 
programmes, which are considered mainly to protect newly emerging risk 
groups. 
Previous studies on insecure workers have tended to focus mainly on 
their unemployment risk. However, the literature dealing with the post-
industrial labour market shows that many workers have suffered from 
multiple types of insecurity, which new forms of employment bring about. 
Thus, this dissertation defines insecure workers as those engaged in paid work 
who face a higher incidence of unemployment, as well as low income and/or 
limited rights to social benefits or collective bargaining. To compare union 
memberships and policy preferences among different types of insecure 
workers, this research classifies these individuals into four different groups: 
part-time employees, temporary workers, low-skilled workers in the service 
sector, and solo self-employed workers.
The analyses of insecure workers’ unionisation focus on the 
institutional contexts surrounding them. The first sub-study explores the 
unionisation of insecure workers by European industrial relations regime by 
estimating multilevel binary logistic models with the data from the European 
Social Survey Round 5 (2010). The second one investigates insecure workers’ 
choices regarding unemployment insurance and union membership after the 
reform of the Finnish Ghent system in 1992 by conducting multinomial logistic 
regression analysis with the pooled Finnish Income Distribution Survey data 
from 2000 to 2012. On the other hand, the third and fourth sub-studies to 
examine insecure workers’ preferences for new social policy ideas concentrate 
on universal basic income and social investment policy for unemployment, 
respectively. To address these topics, both sub-studies estimate binary logistic 
regression models with clustered standard errors and country dummies by 
using the data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016)
The first sub-study reveals that insecure workers’ inclination to join a 
union varies according to their form of employment and the industrial 
relations regime which they belong to. In the organised corporatism regime, 
none of the insecure worker groups shows a difference from other employees. 
However, it has been found that temporary employees in the social 
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partnership regime and part-time employees in the polarised/state-centred 
regime are less likely to be unionised. In the liberal regime, part-time workers 
and fixed-term employees are more likely to decline to have union 
membership, whereas low-skilled service workers tend to be more unionised 
than others. Finally, the results show that in the transitional regime, 
temporary workers and low-skilled service employees are less likely to join a 
union.
The second sub-study illustrates that in the transformed Finnish Ghent 
system, both part-time and temporary employees are inclined to have no 
union membership, whereas low-skilled service workers do not make 
significantly different choices from other employees. Meanwhile, the findings 
demonstrate that part-time workers are also unlikely to enrol in an
independent unemployment insurance fund, but temporary employees tend 
to prefer the independent fund to trade unions in case they wish to have 
unemployment insurance fund membership. 
When it comes to insecure workers’ preferences for universal basic 
income, the third sub-study shows that only temporary employees tend to have 
more favourable attitudes among different groups of insecure workers. In this 
regard, it is found that income and subjective employment insecurity serve as 
mediators between temporary employment and the preference for universal 
basic income. In contrast, the findings do not provide evidence that part-time 
workers, low-skilled service employees, or solo self-employed workers are 
more likely to support universal basic income schemes.
The fourth sub-study demonstrates that in a budgetary trade-off 
scenario between social protection and social investment, part-time 
permanent employees are inclined to be more supportive of social investment 
policy, whereas part-time temporary workers are less likely to support it. On 
the other hand, full-time temporary employees and solo self-employed 
workers do not exhibit significantly different preferences from standard 
employees.
Previous studies of insecure workers have tended to magnify the 
contrasts in political preferences between secure and insecure workers but pay 
little attention to the disparities between the sub-groups of insecure workers. 
This dissertation reveals that insecure workers’ commitments to unions and 
policy preferences vary considerably with the type of employment or the 
institutional background to which they belong. Simply put, it can be concluded 
that insecure workers are a heterogeneous group, at least as far as the issues 
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1 INTRODUCTION
I am an insecure worker. For the last couple of decades, I have made a living 
by relying on fixed-term contracts and occasional part-time jobs, such as a 
grant-funded researcher, private tutor, and call centre operator. Financial 
hardship accompanied by precarious employment have often made my living 
more insecure and unstable. Trade unions, however, have never been helpful 
in improving my income or working conditions and unemployment insurance 
schemes have often restricted my entitlement to unemployment benefits. 
These circumstances often make me feel like an outsider or marginal worker 
in the labour market, while at the same time piquing my interest in the recent 
public debate about new welfare policy ideas, such as basic income. My 
experience is not unique. Nowadays there are a tremendous number of 
insecure workers, and the trend is growing gradually throughout the world. 
Automation has displaced many jobs, and non-standard employment has 
become increasingly dominant in the post-industrial labour market 
(Allmendinger et al., 2013; Barbier, 2013; Kalleberg, 2000; Standing, 2011). 
The rapid rise of service industries has created a massive number of low-skill 
service jobs (Bonoli, 2007; Oesch, 2013), and the number of self-employed 
workers who run small businesses without recruiting a single employee has 
increased continuously. Compared to the self-employed considered to be 
petite bourgeoisie, they tend to suffer more easily from economic insecurity 
(Arum and Müller, 2004; Jansen, 2019). Furthermore, the development of a 
gig economy based on digital platforms has generated a huge number of bogus 
self-employed workers (Heyes and Hastings, 2017). Given the situation, this 
dissertation began with curiosity about insecure workers’ preferences for trade 
unions, which are a traditional political agency for workers, and new welfare 
programmes, which are considered mainly to protect newly emerging risk 
groups. Having union membership can be interpreted as ongoing support for 
the old agency in welfare states, while positive attitudes towards new social 
policy ideas imply agreement with the necessity for welfare state reforms. 
Therefore, this dissertation consists of four sub-studies that concentrate on 
two issues concerning insecure workers: their union membership (sub-studies 
I and II) and their attitudes towards new social policy ideas, in particular 
universal basic income and social investment (sub-studies III and IV).
It is well known that workers’ strong solidarity with trade unions and 
high demand for social protection were important driving forces for the 
expansion of welfare states in Europe during the industrialisation period. In 
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contrast, recent studies show that low-skilled, part-time, and temporary 
workers tend to be less unionised than the average worker because trade 
unions do not seem to be willing or able to explicitly defend their interests 
(Allern et al., 2007; Bonoli, 2005; Ebbinghaus, 2006; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011; 
Häusermann, 2012; Lindbeck and Snower, 2002; Rueda, 2007). Considering 
these findings, the loss of membership resulting from an increasing share of 
insecure workers could erode the political agency role of trade unions in 
general. However, one shortcoming in the literature has been a failure to 
consider those characteristics of industrial relations regimes that could affect
insecure workers’ unionisation. What if some insecure worker groups are 
unlikely to join a union only in countries with a certain type of industrial 
relations regime? As the main components of industrial relations regimes such 
as employment protection legislation and collective bargaining systems tend 
to influence insecure workers’ status in the labour market (Biegert, 2019; 
Cazes et al., 2019) and the operation of those institutions are closely connected 
with trade unions, it is likely that insecure workers’ unionisation varies 
depending on industrial relations regimes. Thus, sub-study I analysed the 
unionisation of insecure workers by European industrial relations regimes. Its 
main research question is: What are the differences and similarities in 
unionisation of insecure workers by type of work and European industrial 
relations regime?
Contrary to most welfare states, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have 
voluntary unemployment insurance schemes called the Ghent system. This is 
closely associated with unionisation because employees have the right to 
decide whether to join earnings-related unemployment insurance, which is 
administered not by the government but by trade union-linked funds. A very 
rich literature confirms that, traditionally, the Ghent system has contributed 
strongly to high union densities (Calmfors et al., 2001; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011; 
Neumann et al., 1991; Rasmussen and Pontusson, 2018; Scruggs, 2002; 
Western, 1993). On the other hand, recent studies have revealed that Ghent 
system reforms implemented in Nordic countries since the late 20th century 
have had a negative impact on their union densities (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 
2006; Høgedahl and Kongshøj; 2017). However, there is a scarcity of research 
on insecure workers’ choices regarding unemployment insurance and union 
membership in the transformed Ghent system, even though these workers 
have a good chance of having to rely on unemployment benefits in the near 
future. This implies that there is little knowledge about how the Ghent system 
reforms have affected insecure workers’ unionisation and unemployment 
insurance coverage. What are the differences in union and unemployment 
insurance fund membership choices between part-time, temporary, and low-
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skilled service workers in the reformed Finnish Ghent system? To answer this 
research question, sub-study II examined different groups of insecure workers’ 
choices after the Ghent system transformation, concentrating on Finland.
Many political economy researchers have analysed the differences in 
political preferences and welfare attitudes between labour market insiders and 
outsiders (Guillaud and Marx, 2014; Garritzmann et al., 2018; Häusermann et 
al., 2016; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). However, because high-quality surveys 
on the topic were limited until a few years ago, there are very few studies about 
universal basic income preferences. In particular, insecure workers’ attitudes 
towards universal basic income have not yet been thoroughly examined, 
although the programme is often considered an alternative social policy to 
alleviate the risks faced by insecure workers (Standing, 2012; Van Parijs, 
2004). Are insecure workers more likely to support the introduction of 
universal basic income schemes? Sub-study III aimed to answer the research 
question by studying the opinions of insecure workers concerning universal 
basic income, focusing on four groups of insecure workers: part-time, 
temporary, low-skilled service, and solo self-employed workers. As the idea of 
basic income has gained global attention in recent years, in 2016 the European 
Social Survey collected respondents’ opinions about it. To answer the question, 
the sub-study analysed the data from the survey which are suitable for 
exploring various factors related to individual support for universal basic 
income.
Nowadays, social investment is one of the main themes in the policy 
debate on welfare reform. In response to post-industrialisation and population 
ageing, the European Union accepted the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and the 
Social Investment Package in 2013 to encourage member countries to carry 
out welfare reforms based on the social investment paradigm. Since then, a 
considerable volume of research has analysed individual preferences for social 
investment ideas or policies and has shown that the approach of social 
investment is generally highly supported by the public (Busemeyer and 
Neimanns, 2017; Garritzmann et al., 2018). In addition, Busemeyer and 
Garritzmann (2017) and Neimanns et al. (2018) demonstrated how public 
support for social investment changes with the assumption that 
unemployment benefits need to be reduced to expand social investment policy. 
On the other hand, such an assumption contains very little knowledge about 
the attitudes of insecure workers towards the social investment approach, even 
though they are more likely to become unemployed and at the same time to 
have fewer job training opportunities than workers on standard employment 
(Cutuli and Guetto, 2013; Forrier and Sels, 2003). Therefore, sub-study IV 
looked into part-time, temporary, and solo self-employed workers’ support for 
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increasing job training by reducing unemployment benefits to answer the 
following research question: What groups of insecure workers are more or 
less likely to support the social investment policy to enhance vocational 
training and education at the cost of unemployment benefit reduction?
This dissertation’s main contribution to the literature on insecure 
workers is to demonstrate the similarities and differences in preferences for 
union membership and new social policy ideas between insecure workers and 
those with jobs and income security, and also among different groups of
insecure workers. Previous studies of insecure workers have tended to magnify 
the contrasts in political preferences between secure and insecure workers but 
pay little attention to the disparities between the sub-groups of insecure 
workers. This dissertation reveals that there are complicated dynamics in 
workers’ opinions regarding union membership and alternative social policy 
ideas beyond this simple dichotomy. 
This dissertation first presents some theoretical background, beginning 
with a literature review that addresses various perspectives on insecure 
workers, institutional changes related to trade unions in the post-industrial 
labour market, determinants of union membership, the Ghent system reforms, 
universal basic income schemes, and public opinion for the notion of social 
investment. Hypotheses associated with the above-mentioned questions are 
then established based on the literature review, after which the methods used 
in each sub-study are introduced. The European Social Survey Round 5 data 
(2010) and data from the Finnish Income Distribution Survey from 2000 to 
2012 were analysed for sub-studies I and II, respectively. The European Social 
Survey Round 8 data (2016) were employed for both sub-studies III and IV. 
Subsequently, the main results section demonstrates that the union 
memberships of insecure workers vary depending on the types of employment 
and the institutional characteristics of industrial relations, and that their 
preferences for new social policy ideas are divided according to the 
circumstances that confront each group of insecure workers. The concluding 
section summarises the findings and discusses their implications for the 
literature on insecure workers. In addition, it reflects on the limitations of this 
dissertation and suggests future research ideas.
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 INSECURE WORKER GROUPS
There are three major perspectives on dealing with vulnerable or insecure 
work forces emerging in the post-industrial labour market: the insider-
outsider models in labour economics and political economy; the approach 
focused on precarious employment status; and the perspective based on the 
concept of new social risks. This section reviews these perspectives and then 
organises four categories of insecure workers for analysis.
Reich et al.’s 1973 study showed that segmented labour markets 
originate and are developed not by external factors but by political and 
economic forces within capitalism. Since that study was released, labour 
market segmentation has been keenly analysed by sociologists, economists, 
and political scientists. Lindbeck and Snower (1989) introduced the concept 
of insiders and outsiders in segmented labour markets to show how different 
the two groups’ situations are. They define insiders as employees whose jobs 
are protected by various measures and outsiders as the unemployed or 
workers in the informal sector. This approach tends to conceptualise insiders 
and outsiders by determining whether they have permanent and full-time 
employment. The recent insider-outsider literature has developed the analysis 
further by measuring prospective unemployment risks by occupational group 
and identifying which group an individual worker belongs to (Schwander, 
2019). As both approaches regard the stability of employment as the essential 
delimitation between insiders and outsiders, ‘outsiders’ generally refer to 
employees in an unstable and insecure position (Emmenegger, 2009; Guillaud 
and Marx, 2014; Garritzmann et al., 2018; Häusermann et al., 2016; 
Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014; Rueda, 2007). 
For this reason, labour market outsiders and insecure workers overlap to a 
considerable extent. However, the most significant shortcoming of the insider-
outsider perspective is that it concentrates on the political differences between 
insiders and outsiders by lumping together diverse types of insecure workers, 
while paying no attention to possible variances within labour market outsiders. 
Hence, Barbier (2013) criticised the separation between insiders and outsiders 
as being so simplistic that it does not adequately reflect reality. Another 
limitation is that this perspective tends to ignore income disparity between 
insiders and outsiders in analysing their policy preferences by brushing aside 
the fact that unstable or low income is another consequence of their 
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employment insecurity.
Since Kalleberg’s (2011) seminal publication, the concept of precarious 
work has been used widely in many recent publications addressing insecure 
workers. Although there is a criticism that the ways to define precarious work 
and measure precariousness are ambiguous and incomprehensive (Olsthoorn, 
2014), precarious work generally means work that involves job insecurity and 
employment uncertainty, provides limited economic and social benefits, and 
has limited statutory entitlements in employment relations (Kalleberg, 2018). 
The precarious work literature concentrates mainly on job insecurity and often 
uses non-standard employment status—such as temporary employment, 
(involuntary) part-time work, and own-account self-employment—to 
categorise precarious work. This approach is limited in that income insecurity 
is not specifically considered an element of precarious work (Olsthoorn, 2014), 
even though empirical studies demonstrate that workers in non-standard
employment are placed in precarious situations in terms of both employment 
and income. Nowadays, it is very easy to find people who work on fixed-term 
or part-time contracts, particularly among young people. It is no longer 
strange that university graduates hold part-time jobs in the food service 
industry, or that a large number of public sector employees work on temporary 
contracts. Research has demonstrated that temporary workers tend to suffer 
from job and income insecurity and confront higher poverty risks than those 
in standard employment (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Giesecke, 2009; Van 
Lancker, 2013), and that the earnings of part-time workers, whose job 
opportunities are relatively limited, are significantly lower than those of 
standard employees (Horemans and Marx, 2013). In addition, a significant 
proportion of Europe’s working poor is self-employed (Halleröd et al., 2015). 
Actually, it is hard to expect that a man selling snacks from his food truck 
would maintain a stable, high income. Not surprisingly, previous studies have 
shown that solo entrepreneurs tend to have more irregular and lower income 
and a higher unemployment risk (Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008; Dekker, 
2010; Pedersini and Coletto, 2009). Besides non-standard employment, it 
should be noted that the rise of precarious employment has been fuelled by 
not only the growth of non-standard jobs but also the declining quality of 
standard employment (Dekker and van der Veen, 2017; Keune and Pedaci, 
2020). That is, insecure workers may exist regardless of their employment 
status.
Researchers analysing welfare states in terms of new social risks (NSRs) 
treat low skilled workers in service jobs as a vulnerable group in the post-
industrial labour market, although the notion of NSRs was not established to 
explain insecure workers. Old social risks (OSRs) refer to those that the public 
7
collectively addressed during industrialisation, such as unemployment, illness, 
and disability, while NSRs are those that many individuals newly experience 
in their lives due to the socio-economic transformations associated with post-
industrialisation, such as work-life imbalance, long-term care, a low-skilled 
workforce in the service sector, and inadequate social security (Taylor-Gooby, 
2004; Bonoli, 2006; Bonoli, 2007). Low skill service jobs are closely associated 
with income insecurity, even if they are based on standard employment 
contracts. Unlike manufacturing jobs, workers in jobs such as retail, cleaning, 
catering, and hospitality—jobs that contribute little to increased value and 
productivity (Bonoli, 2007; Pierson, 1998)—are likely to earn low wages and 
experience low-quality working conditions (Oesch, 2013; Schwander and 
Häusermann, 2013). Moreover, low skilled workers tend to experience long-
term unemployment and early retirement because they have less frequent job 
opportunities and compete for low-paid service jobs with each other and also 
with more educated people (Ebbinghaus, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1993). 
Their lower income and fewer working years are highly likely to lead to low 
pension incomes after retirement. Low-skilled service workers intersect with 
labour market outsiders and workers in precarious employment in many 
respects. However, in as much as they are likely to suffer from income 
insecurity and have limited opportunities to access better jobs independently 
from their current employment status, these workers can be regarded as a 
separate insecure group.
As the review of the various perspectives on insecure workers emerging 
in the post-industrial labour market demonstrate that labour forces have been 
recently divided in different ways and aspects, and various types of insecurity 
have occurred, it is not reasonable to regard insecure workers as a 
homogenous group. Hence, this study combines diverse aspects of the 
approaches reviewed above to focus on the notion of insecure workers, 
defined as people in paid work who face a higher incidence of unemployment, 
as well as low income and/or limited rights to social benefits or collective 
bargaining. Considering that the various approaches used to identify insecure 
workers employ different criteria and indicators, it can be assumed that they 
consist of heterogeneous sub-groups and that their decision making in the 
labour market and welfare preferences may vary according to the interests and 
circumstances each group commonly shares. In addition, the interest of this 
study lies not in measuring how insecure an individual worker is but in 
identifying what groups of workers experience high levels of insecurity on 
average. Therefore, in this study, insecure workers are categorised into part-
time employees, temporary workers, low-skilled workers in the service sector, 
and solo self-employed workers. To be more specific, part-time or fixed-term 
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employment workers were addressed in all the sub-studies, low-skilled service 
workers were analysed in sub-studies I, II, and III, and the solo self-employed 
were dealt with in sub-studies III and IV.
2.2 INSECURE WORKERS’ UNIONISATION
2.2.1 BEING AN INSECURE WORKER
Studies on the factors that encourage or discourage employees to join unions 
have evolved since Olson (1965) suggested a theory of collective action. Olson’s 
theory concentrates on workers’ own cost-benefit comparisons, assuming that 
from an economic perspective, each individual is a rational person. According 
to this theory, employees evaluate the prospective benefits and costs of 
becoming a union member. Based on the evaluation, they are likely to join a 
union if having membership is beneficial; otherwise, they are not. On the other 
hand, the social custom theory highlights the reputations that individual 
workers gain at workplaces by being unionised or not. This perspective 
assumes that if someone does not obey their own customs that members in a 
group share, they would lose reputation within their group. Hence, this theory 
states that as unionising is a customary rule that each worker should follow in 
the workplace, employees tend to join a union to avoid being criticised by their 
colleagues (Booth, 1985). Consequently, this approach implies that individuals’ 
decisions to join a union are interdependent (Schnabel and Wagner, 2007).
Considering the economic approach and social custom theory, probably 
trade union membership would not be very attractive to insecure workers. 
Having known that trade unions tend to be more active in advocating the 
interests of permanent full-time workers than those of non-standard workers 
(Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Lindbeck and Snower, 2002; Rueda, 2007), 
temporary workers and part-time employees are unlikely to feel a huge need 
to join a union in terms of cost-benefit analysis. In addition, union 
membership as a custom would hardly be effective in unionising insecure 
workers. In traditional workplace settings such as factories, maintaining a 
good reputation may be considered important, because most employees have 
standard employment and maintain regular face-to-face contact with many 
co-workers, and their job tenures last over decades. However, this notion 
would not be applicable to insecure workers, as temporary workers are 
supposed to leave the job when their contract has expired, and part-time 
employees and low skilled service workers have relatively fewer or more 
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irregular contacts with colleagues (Visser, 2002). Moreover, their job turnover 
is relatively high. Consequently, insecure workers are less likely to think of 
becoming a union member as a social custom than standard workers.
In addition to these approaches, there is another perspective on 
determinants of union membership emphasising institutional factors. 
Rothstein (1990) highlighted the effect of voluntary unemployment insurance 
schemes, namely the Ghent system, on union membership. Hancké (1993) 
claimed the importance of unions’ access to the workplace level. In addition, 
Western (1994) focused on strong working-class political parties and 
centralised collective bargaining. In the next sub-chapters, industrial relations 
regimes and the Ghent system are reviewed to understand insecure workers’ 
union membership in the context of institutions. 
2.2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIMES
Collective bargaining coverage and unions’ bargaining power and 
political influence, which are essential elements of industrial relations, may 
affect insecure workers’ decision-making concerning union membership 
because those factors contribute to ameliorating or aggravating their 
vulnerability. Sub-study I employed Visser’s (European Commission, 2009) 
typology of industrial relations regimes (IR regimes) to distinguish between 
the institutional characteristics of different countries that have effects on 
union membership. It divides European IR regimes into five categories: 1) 
organised corporatism, 2) social partnership, 3) polarised/state-centred, 4) 
liberal, and 5) transitional. The classification of the 23 European countries into 
these categories is presented in Table 1.1
The higher the collective bargaining coverage rate, the more likely 
insecure workers are to be protected by collective agreements. In addition, if 
unions can have a substantial influence over policies related to employment 
relations by advocating all groups of workers, this may be an incentive to 
encourage insecure workers to be unionised. Weiler (2004) demonstrated that 
in countries where collective bargaining coverage is high, unions exert their 
substantial influence on governmental decision-making on labour and social 
policy. Hence, it is probable that the unionisation rates of insecure workers are 
higher in the industrial relations regimes where collective bargaining coverage 
is the widest. The collective bargaining coverages of the liberal and transitional 
regimes are only 40% and 30% of employees, respectively, while in the other 
1 The typology is based on Ebbinghaus and Visser (1997) and Crouch (1993).
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IR regimes, their average coverage rates are over 75%2 (European Trade Union 
Institute, 2014). Consequently, insecure workers in the liberal and transitional 
IR regimes may be less likely to feel the necessity of union membership, while 
those in organised corporatism, social partnership and polarised/state-
centred regimes are as likely to have union membership as other workers.
Considering all the above points, the hypotheses associated with 
insecure workers’ union membership are set up as follows:
H1a: In the liberal and transitional IR regimes, insecure workers 
(part-time workers, temporary employees, and low-skilled 
service workers) are less likely to be union members than other 
employees.
H1b: In the organised corporatism regime, social partnership, and 
polarised/state-centred regimes, insecure workers (part-time 
workers, temporary employees, and low-skilled service 
workers) are as likely to be union members as other workers.
Table 1 Country classification according to industrial relations regimes
Regime Countries
Organised corporatism Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Social partnership Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland
Polarised/state-centred France, Greece, Portugal, Spain
Liberal Cyprus, Ireland, The United Kingdom
Transitional
Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia
Note: This table includes only the countries included in the European Social Survey round 5 data (2010).
2.2.3 THE EFFECTS OF THE TRANSFORMED GHENT SYSTEM
The Ghent system, which has been in operation in Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden, is the second institutional factor of union membership that this 
2 The figures were derived by using the data from the European Trade Union Institute (2014).
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study concentrates on. It is well known that the system is powerfully effective 
in recruiting union members (Calmfors et al., 2001; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011; 
Neumann et al., 1991; Rasmussen and Pontusson, 2018; Scruggs, 2002; 
Western, 1993), because in this system, employees themselves voluntarily 
decide whether to enrol in unemployment insurance, and trade union-linked 
funds rather than governments administer the voluntary members’ 
contributions and benefits. However, the Ghent systems of all the Nordic 
countries were reformed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In Finland 
and Sweden, independent unemployment insurance funds (henceforth UI 
funds) that employees can join regardless of union membership were 
introduced in 1992 and 1998 respectively. In Denmark in 2002, it became 
possible for workers to enrol in any UI fund without boundaries between 
professions. These changes have weakened the influence of the Ghent system 
on union membership (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006; Høgedahl and 
Kongshøj, 2017). It is very plausible that the introduction of more flexible 
schemes affects insecure workers’ decision-making related to union 
membership because it may bring changes to the way insecure workers 
perceive union membership. Therefore, sub-study II scrutinised insecure 
employees’ union and UI membership in the transformed Finnish Ghent 
system.
In Finland, UI benefits consist of earnings-related and basic benefits. 
The former is provided through UI funds based on the Ghent system, while the 
latter is administered by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela) and 
the public employment service (TE-Office). Unemployed people who have UI 
membership can receive the earnings-related unemployment allowance, while 
the unemployed who did not belong to any UI fund are entitled to the basic 
allowance. The average amount of basic allowance was €703 per month and in 
2016 it was paid for 100 weeks.3 The amount of earnings-related allowance is 
considerably higher than the basic one, because the replacement rates 
applying to most UI fund members are higher than 60% (Kyyrä et al., 2017). 
As of 2018, there are 24 UI funds. 23 of them are managed by unions, whereas 
only one which was introduced in 1992 is operated independently of unions. 
In terms of cost, the union membership fee is considerably higher than that of 
the independent UI fund. In Finland, unions charge between 1% and 2% of 
gross earnings or a flat fee of around €400 per year, which usually include both 
union membership and union-linked UI fund membership fees. However, the 
3 Although the basic allowance has a flat rate in principle, the specific amount of benefit 
changes according to the number of children at home. The payment duration has been cut 
to 80 weeks since 2017.
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independent UI fund has charged much lower annual membership fees. It was 
€118 in 2017 and €110 in 2019. To sum up, there are three options that workers 
can choose for their unemployment protection in Finland: having a union 
membership, joining the independent UI fund, and relying on basic 
unemployment allowance.
To predict different insecure worker groups’ choices about union and 
UI fund memberships in the reformed Ghent system, it is necessary to look 
into their average incomes since their income levels are an important criterion 
for determining their membership fees and amounts of future earnings-
related unemployment allowances. Figure 1 displays the average incomes of 
wage earners in Finland from 2000 to 2012. It is found that the income levels 
of insecure worker groups are even lower than that of other employees. The 
average income of all employees was €25,000 euros in 2000, and it increased 
to €35,000 in 2010. However, the average income for part-time employees, 
temporary workers and low-skilled service employees had barely reached the 
€30,000 level even in 2012. Among those groups, part-timers showed the 
lowest average income, followed by fixed-term employees. Low-skilled 
workers in the service sector had relatively a higher average income. 
Considering their very low average income, part-time employees would 
be less likely to join a UI fund than full-time workers. First, it is difficult to 
guarantee their entitlement to earnings-related unemployment allowances 
due to their low income and limited working hours. Second, when they become 
unemployed, a large proportion of part-timers would not receive earnings-
related benefits considerably higher than the sum of the basic unemployment 
allowance and UI fund membership fee they would pay during employment. 
That is, from an economic perspective, joining a UI fund is not economically 
attractive to many part-time workers. In addition, as mentioned earlier, they 
tend to have less interest in gaining a good reputation at the workplace by 
becoming a union member owing to their less constant contact with other 
employees. 
Temporary contract employees are less likely to feel the necessity to join 
a union because they plan to leave the job when their contracts finish. On the 
other hand, they might want to enrol in a UI fund, because their average 
income is even higher than that of part-timers and this means, for most 
temporary employees, the earnings-related unemployment allowance option 
would be more beneficial than the basic allowance option. Moreover, the 
independent UI fund membership fee being cheaper than union membership 
dues could be a great incentive to encourage them to subscribe to the UI fund. 
When it comes to low-skilled service workers, they would not give up 
UI fund membership, because their income level is high enough to receive 
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advantageous earnings-related benefits in case of unemployment. Regarding 
the choice between unions and the independent UI fund, there are conflicting 
incentives associated with choosing each of them. Unions provide their 
members with additional services such as legal advice, travel insurance, job 
information and occupational training. Moreover, Finnish trade unions have 
strong collective bargaining power and around 90% of collective bargaining 
coverage, which can be incentives for low-skilled service workers to take union 
membership. In the case of the independent UI fund, the low membership fee 
plays an important part for low-skilled service workers whose income level is 
lower than that of average employees. Occasionally, however, the extensive 
collective bargaining coverage may allow them to have a free ride. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of the social custom theory, they are less 
likely to feel the necessity of union membership due to their fewer chances for 
face-to-face contact with colleagues. On the whole, given the conflicting factors 
concerning the choice between unions and the independent UI fund, it is 
difficult to expect which one low-skilled service employees tend to select. 
Consequently, it seems that both perspectives offset each other, although they 
may influence their decision-making.
Therefore, the hypotheses about insecure workers’ union and UI fund
memberships in the Finnish Ghent system are as follows:
H2a: Being a part-time employee increases the probability of not 
joining a trade union or the independent UI fund.  
H2b: Being a temporary employee increases the probability of 
having no UI membership, and at the same time the probability 
of joining the independent UI fund instead of a trade union.
H2c: Being a low-skilled worker in the service industry does not 
affect the probability of having UI membership, nor does it 
affect the probability of joining the independent UI fund instead 
of a trade union.
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Figure 1 Estimated average annual personal wages and salaries of insecure
workers and all workers
Report for each year from 2002 to 2012.
Note: The wages and salaries are indicated by nominal wages and salaries. The average basic 
unemployment allowances w
numbers for 2000 and 2001 are excluded in this figure because their currency is not in euros but 
in Finnish markka.
2.3 PREFERENCES FOR NEW SOCIAL POLICY IDEAS
2.3.1 UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME
The proportion of insecure workers has continued to increase in the 
post-industrial economy (Kalleberg, 2009; 2018), but existing social security 
schemes often fail to adequately cover them (Bonoli, 2005; Schulze Buschoff 
and Protsch, 2008; Rueda, 2014). Moreover, it is expected that technological 
advancements and automation would keep increasing non-standard 
employment and unemployment in the future (OECD, 2016). This 
attention to UBI schemes as a new social policy programme for the post-
industrial welfare state, since the Swiss basic income referendum of 2016 and 
the Finnish basic income experiment of 2017-2018. In particular, advocates of
UBI schemes argue that they will be effective in alleviating the risks faced by 
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workers in precarious jobs (Standing, 2012; Van Parijs, 2004). As it is known 
that workers with unstable and insecure employment tend to be more 
supportive of redistributive measures (Guillaud and Marx, 2014; Garritzmann 
et al., 2018; Häusermann et al., 2016; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014), this 
perspective could also apply to UBI. However, there is a paucity of studies
which show insecure workers’ attitudes towards the introduction of UBI 
schemes. Therefore, sub-study III tried to find novel evidence concerning the 
dynamics of contemporary labour markets and social policy institutions by 
examining the opinions of insecure workers on UBI.
According to the definition of the Basic Income Earth Network (2019), 
UBI means “a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an 
individual basis, without means-test or work requirement”, and this is also 
often called basic income, citizen’s income, citizen’s basic income, social 
dividend or universal grant (Citizen’s Basic Income Trust, 2019). The essential 
feature of UBI is that a specific amount of money is paid to every resident 
unconditionally and periodically. At the same time, UBI schemes can be 
designed variously according to the level of payment, income tax rates, and the 
relationship with existing welfare systems. Sub-study III explored insecure 
workers’ UBI preferences by taking these points into account.
The literature displayed that part-time work and fixed-term contract 
employment are likely to increase income and job insecurity, which can lead 
to poverty (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Horemans and Marx, 2013; Van 
Lancker, 2013). Moreover, workers in these types of employment tend to have 
troubles in being fully protected by social security in most European countries 
because they often cannot gain entitlements for unemployment benefits 
(Matsaganis et al., 2016; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008). Such economic 
insecurity can make part-timers and temporary workers supportive of the 
expansion of redistributive policies, and exclusion from the social security 
system can inspire their desire for welfare system reform. Hence, the factors 
would induce them to have a positive opinion of UBI, though it is not the only 
solution for their needs. If UBI were paid, part-time employees could have 
lower levels of stress and worry caused from not having full-time jobs, and 
temporary workers would regard unceasing UBI payments as a reliable income 
support that can compensate for their uncertainty after their contracts expire. 
As a result, it is expected that job uncertainty and income insecurity would 
function as intermediate variables between these types of work and UBI 
preferences.
It is expected that low-skilled workers in the service sector would show 
different attitudes towards UBI from part-timers and fixed-term employees. 
Unskilled or low-skilled workers tend to prefer the expansion of redistribution 
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and welfare policies (Jæger, 2006; Linos and West, 2003; Svallfors, 2004; 
Wren and Rehm, 2013), because these employees are the most vulnerable 
group in every country (Häusermann et al., 2016). Particularly, low-skilled 
service employees are likely to suffer from low wages and poor working 
conditions because their jobs based on lower skills are more prone to the global 
transformation of the labour market (Ebbinghaus, 2007; Oesch, 2013). This 
factor might incentivise them to welcome UBI given its potential contribution 
to redistribution. However, it should be noted that there are many alternative 
redistribution measures other than UBI. Furthermore, it is hard to predict that 
low-skilled service workers would have a significantly high demand for the 
restructuring of social protection, because they qualify for all welfare benefits 
in general, unless they are in temporary or part-time employment. Therefore, 
low-skilled service employees’ preferences for UBI are unlikely to be stronger 
than those of other workers. 
A majority of solo entrepreneurs have different characteristics from the 
self-employed running stable businesses with their employees. They tend to 
set up in business owing to difficulty in getting a job, depending on irregular, 
potentially lower income, being excluded from earnings-related social 
insurance or pension schemes, and experiencing a high risk of unemployment 
(Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008; Dekker, 2010; Jansen, 2019; Pedersini 
and Coletto, 2009). These insecure circumstances that are similar to what 
temporary workers face may encourage solo self-employed workers to have a 
positive stance towards the introduction of UBI. However, it must be 
considered that they show basically different attitudes towards welfare policies 
from temporary employees. Jansen (2019) revealed that solo self-employed 
workers tend to oppose the expansion of social protection for workers, because 
they are potential employers and would consider temporary workers to be an 
important source of employment for their businesses. Accordingly, their 
demand on income security and their negative stance towards social 
protection would collide with each other, which would not make any difference 
in their UBI preferences.
Based on the theoretical background, the following hypotheses are 
established to verify the associations between being an insecure worker and 
UBI preferences.
H3a: Part-time workers are more likely to be more supportive of the 
introduction of UBI schemes than full-time workers.
H3b: Temporary employees are more likely to be more supportive of 
the introduction of UBI schemes than permanent employees.
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H3c: The attitudes of low-skilled service sector employees towards 
the introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different 
from those of other workers.
H3d: The attitudes of solo self-employed workers towards the 
introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different 
from those of permanent employees.
2.3.2 SOCIAL INVESTMENT APPROACH TO UNEMPLOYMENT
Recently, the idea of social investment has been widely supported by 
scholars and policy makers lately (Kuitto, 2016). The social investment policy 
to expand job training and education can be a complementary or alternative 
approach to traditional passive social insurance schemes, which aim to 
compensate and restore unemployed workers’ lost income (Beramendi et al, 
2015), and activation programmes, which encourage the unemployed to get a 
job by enforcing welfare conditionality and imposing sanctions (Fossati, 2018; 
Knotz, 2018). Research shows that upskilling the unemployed via vocational 
training is the most social investment oriented active labour market policy
(ALMP) (Bonoli, 2012; Morel et al, 2012; Hemerijck, 2018). On the other hand, 
in an age of permanent austerity, one of the major barriers in implementing 
such an approach may be financial limitations, because governments have to
provide funds for social protection as well as social investment, and sometimes 
a trade-off between expenditures for both of them is found (Bengtsson et al, 
2017). Hence, it is likely that investment in vocational training could be 
enhanced at a cost of reducing unemployment benefits. On the other hand, 
there is little knowledge about public opinion on the social investment 
approach to unemployment in a budgetary trade-off scenario. Therefore, sub-
study IV examined preferences of economically active people for the policy to 
increase social investment for the unemployed by reducing unemployment 
benefits, in particular focusing on insecure workers who are considered to 
experience a higher unemployment risk.  
Part-time jobs tend to be undertaken by people who need to participate 
in economic activity, while caring for family members or acquiring education 
for future careers (Horemans and Marx, 2013). Thus, many part-timers would 
be likely to want to have a full-time job after their current personal tasks 
terminate. However, part-time employees usually have shorter job tenures and 
suffer from limited employment opportunities (Horemans and Marx, 2013). 
Because more chances of upskilling would be helpful for them to overcome 
these problems, it is probable that they would basically take a positive view of 
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the objective of the approach to increase job training and education. On the 
other hand, their attitudes towards reducing unemployment benefit in order 
to make funding for such programme would depend on whether their 
employment contracts are permanent or temporary. Part-time workers with 
permanent contracts would be less sensitive to such reductions due to their 
relatively low unemployment risks. By contrast, part-time employees with 
fixed-term contracts are more likely to have a negative stance because they 
have a higher incidence of unemployment and also probably their 
unemployment benefits, which are related to their current earnings, would be 
much lower than those of full-time workers. For part-time temporary 
employees, this potential income loss might be a powerful disincentive against 
the social investment approach. As a result, it is expected that part-time 
permanent employees are more likely to be supportive of the social investment 
approach than standard workers, while temporary part-time workers are less 
likely.
An unemployment benefit reduction would be an undesirable 
suggestion to full-time workers in fixed-term employment, but their negative 
reactions would be likely to be weaker than those of part-time temporary 
employees because full-time workers’ unemployment benefits are 
considerably higher in an earnings-related unemployment insurance system. 
However, there are factors that may cause full-time temporary workers to have 
a positive attitude towards the social investment approach. As they have fewer 
training opportunities than standard workers, which makes it hard to develop 
their employability (Cutuli and Guetto, 2013; Forrier and Sels, 2003), they 
may feel that policies to expand vocational education and training would be 
beneficial. Moreover, the ultimate goal of most temporary employees is to have 
permanent employment (De Jong et al., 2009). To achieve this objective, they 
could be willing to sacrifice some of their unemployment benefits for job 
training and education. Consequently, it is expected that full-time temporary 
workers would not show a significantly different attitude towards the social 
investment approach from standard employees, because positive and negative 
factors influencing their preferences may compete and cancel out each other’s 
effect. 
The socioeconomic status of solo self-employed workers is different 
from that of the self-employed who are commonly called petty bourgeois 
(Arum and Müller, 2004). Most solo entrepreneurs have low-skilled jobs in 
the service industry (Jansen, 2019) and the growth of the platform economy 
has made a huge number of workers bogusly self-employed (Vandaele, 2018). 
Their vulnerable status often makes them face a higher risk of unemployment 
and suffer from irregular income and exclusion from the social security system 
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(Dekker, 2010; Jansen, 2019; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008). In this 
situation, it is hard to predict that they would be as favourable in reducing 
unemployment benefits as employers are, although they are potential 
employers. Furthermore, the social investment approach would not be 
immediately useful for solo entrepreneurs to employ their employees, since 
generally the reason they do not have an employee is not a shortage in the 
available skilled manpower but because they have difficulty in expanding their 
business. On the other hand, a different point of view suggests that the social 
investment approach might be attractive to them, because it could give such 
precarious business persons more opportunities to take vocational training 
and education. Considering all the points, probably solo self-employed 
workers would be more supportive of the social investment approach than 
standard employees, but less than employers.
As a result, the hypotheses on insecure workers’ preferences for the 
social investment approach to unemployment in a budgetary trade-off 
scenario are organised as follows:
H4a: Part-time permanent employees are more likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits.
H4b: Part-time temporary employees are less likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits.
H4c: Full-time temporary employees’ attitudes towards the social 
investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits 
do not significantly differ from standard employees’ attitudes.
H4d: Solo self-employed workers are more likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits reduction.
H4e: Solo self-employed workers are less likely than employers to 
support the social investment approach which aims to increase 
job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits.
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3 AIMS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
HYPOTHESES
3.1 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This dissertation aims to explore insecure workers’ (i.e., part-time workers, 
temporary employees, low skilled service workers, and solo self-employed 
workers) choices on union membership and opinion on alternative social 
policy ideas in European welfare states and subsequently compare the results 
across insecure worker groups.
To be more specific, sub-study I was conducted based on the concept of 
new social risks. It explores the union membership of six different groups of 
workers in a comparative perspective. They consist of part-time workers, 
temporary employees, low skilled service workers, single-parent employees, 
female employees with children, and female employees who care for 
vulnerable family members. The objective of sub-study I is to compare the 
workers’ unionisation across five European IR regimes embracing 23 
countries. The research question of sub-study I is: What are the differences 
and similarities in unionisation of insecure workers by type of work and 
European IR regime?
Sub-study II analyses insecure workers’ choices regarding union and UI 
fund memberships under the transformed Finnish Ghent system. As the 
independent UI fund which does not require union membership for 
unemployment insurance enrolment was introduced in 1992, this sub-study 
investigates how this reform has affected the unionisation of part-time 
employees, temporary workers, and low skilled service employees in Finland. 
Sub-study II answers the following question: What are the differences in 
union and UI fund membership choices between part-time, temporary, and 
low-skilled service workers in the reformed Finnish Ghent system?
Sub-study III deals with UBI schemes, one of the most controversial 
issues in the recent welfare reform debate. This sub-study focuses on four 
types of insecure workers (i.e., part-time workers, temporary employees, low 
skilled service workers, and solo self-employed workers) in 21 European 
countries and analyses their preferences for the introduction of UBI schemes. 
The research question of this sub-study is as follows: Are insecure workers 
more likely to support the introduction of universal basic income schemes?
In sub-study IV, the focus is on insecure workers’ attitudes towards a 
social investment approach expanding opportunities for job training and 
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education at a cost of unemployment benefit reduction. The analysis is 
targeted at part-time permanent employees, part-time temporary workers, 
full-time temporary employees, and solo self-employed workers in 20 
European countries. Sub-study IV seeks answers to the last research question: 
What groups of insecure workers are more or less likely to support the social 
investment policy to enhance vocational training and education at the cost of 
unemployment benefit reduction?
3.2 HYPOTHESES
In this section, the hypotheses which were established earlier based on the 
literature review are presented again by sub-study.
Sub-study I, which explores the differences and similarities in 
unionisation of insecure workers according to the type of work and the 
European IR regime, has the following hypotheses.
H1a: In the liberal and transitional IR regimes, insecure workers 
(part-time workers, temporary employees, and low-skilled 
service workers) are less likely to be union members than other 
employees.
H1b: In the organised corporatism regime, social partnership, and 
polarised/state-centred regimes, insecure workers (part-time 
workers, temporary employees, and low-skilled service 
workers) are as likely to be union members as other workers.
To analyse insecure workers’ union and UI fund memberships in the 
Finnish Ghent system, sub-study II tests the following three hypotheses.  
H2a: Being a part-time employee increases the probability of not 
joining a trade union or the independent UI fund.
H2b: Being a temporary employee increases the probability of 
having no UI membership, and at the same time the probability 
of joining the independent UI fund instead of a trade union.
H2c: Being a low-skilled worker in the service industry does not 
affect the probability of having UI membership, nor does it 
affect the probability of joining the independent UI fund instead 
of a trade union.
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The hypotheses of sub-study III to focus on insecure workers’ UBI 
preferences are organised as shown below.
H3a: Part-time workers are more likely to be more supportive of the 
introduction of UBI schemes than full-time workers.
H3b: Temporary employees are more likely to be more supportive of 
the introduction of UBI schemes than permanent employees.
H3c: The attitudes of low-skilled service sector employees towards the 
introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different from 
those of other workers.
H3d: The attitudes of solo self-employed workers towards the 
introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different from 
those of permanent employees.
Sub-study IV, which examines insecure workers’ attitudes towards the
social investment approach to unemployment, verifies the following 
hypotheses.
H4a: Part-time permanent employees are more likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits.
H4b: Part-time temporary employees are less likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits.
H4c: Full-time temporary employees’ attitudes towards the social 
investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits 
do not significantly differ from standard employees’ attitudes.
H4d: Solo self-employed workers are more likely than standard 
employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits reduction.
H4e: Solo self-employed workers are less likely than employers to 
support the social investment approach which aims to increase 
job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits.
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4 DATA AND METHODS
4.1 DATA
The main source of data for this dissertation is the European Social Survey 
(ESS) and the Finnish Income Distribution Survey (FIDS) data. The ESS has 
been conducted in European countries via face-to-face interviews biennially 
since 2002. The ESS microdata provide a wide range of variables about 
respondents including union membership and opinion on various social and 
political issues. The FIDS is an annual survey based on a rotating-panel design, 
where each household participated in the survey for two to four consecutive 
years, and new households replace some of the respondents each year. The 
FIDS data contain register-based information on union membership from tax 
authorities since 2003, although they also have information based on 
interviews before that time. Table 2 briefly presents the microdata used for 
each sub-study.
Sub-study I analysed the data set adding one country level variable on 
the Ghent system into the microdata from the ESS Round 5 (2010). Its target 
population is people who are currently both employed and aged between 15 
and 64 in 23 European countries which are classified into five IR regimes 
according to Visser’s (European Commission, 2009) typology. To examine the 
Finnish case, sub-study II used the FIDS data from 2000 to 2012. This survey 
analysed wage and salary earners aged between 15 and 64 in Finland after 
merging the annual datasets from 2000 to 2012. Sub-studies III and IV 
analysed the microdata from the ESS Round 8 (2016). Sub-study III focused 
on the employed and the self-employed aged 15 to 64, while sub-study IV was 
targeted at the economically active population including unemployed job 
seekers.  
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Table 2 Data for analysis by sub-study
Sub-study Data Years Target population Sample size
Study I ESS Round 5 2010 15-64 years; employed in 23 European countries 15,173
Study II FIDS 2000–2012
15-64 years; wage and salary 
earners in Finland 115,452
Study III ESS Round 8 2016 15-64 years; employed and self-employed in 21 European countries  17,515
Study IV ESS Round 8 2016
15-64 years; employed and self-





As sub-study I examined insecure workers’ trade union membership, 
its outcome variable is whether a respondent has union membership or not. 
To estimate statistical models, the dichotomous variable on current union 
membership (current union member = 1 and non-member = 0) was used as 
the dependent variable. On the other hand, sub-study II employed the variable 
of union membership status with three values (union member = 1, UI fund-
only member = 2 and non-membership = 0) under the Finnish Ghent system.4
Next, the outcome variable of sub-study III is a respondent’s opinion about the 
introduction of UBI. Although the original item of ESS Round 8 (2016) has
four values (strongly against = 1, against = 2, in favour = 3, strongly in favour 
= 4), the analysis created a new dichotomous variable (strongly in favour or in 
favour = 1, and strongly against or against = 0) by recoding the item. Finally, 
sub-study IV analysed the binary variable to show a respondent’s opinion 
about increasing public expenditure on education and training programmes 
for the unemployed at the cost of reducing unemployment benefit (strongly in 
4 By law, individuals can join a union-linked UI fund even without union membership. 
However, Finnish trade unions tend to strongly encourage workers to have both union and 
UI fund memberships. Therefore, an absolute majority of wage earners who are a UI fund 
member without union membership are members of the independent UI fund.
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favour or in favour = 1, strongly against or against = 0). Its original variable 
also consists of four values (strongly against = 1, against = 2, in favour = 3, 
strongly in favour = 4). The reason studies III and IV recoded the original 
items is that it is more logical to fit binary logistic regressions rather than 
ordered logistic models, given they do not have a neutral response to the topic 
in the first place.
Table 3 Outcome variable by sub-study
Sub-
study Original item Final variable
I
Q: Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade 









Q: Which trade union or unemployment insurance fund 
does the respondent belong to on the basis of the register 
data?





6) Union member, but membership fee not paid
7) Membership fee paid, but no union information
8) Only unemployment insurance fund membership










Q: A basic income scheme includes all of the following: 
The government pays everyone a monthly income to 
cover essential living costs. It replaces many other social 
benefits. The purpose is to guarantee everyone a 
minimum standard of living. Everyone receives the same 
amount regardless of whether or not they are working. 
People also keep the money they earn from work or other 
sources. This scheme is paid for by taxes. Overall, would 





4) Strongly in favour
Opinion on the 
introduction of a 





Q: Now imagine there is a fixed amount of money that can 
be spent on tackling unemployment. Would you be 
against or in favour of the government spending more on 
education and training programmes for the unemployed at 




4) Strongly in favour
Opinion on the social 
investment approach 
to increase job training 
and education at the 





4.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: INSECURE WORKER GROUPS
Different groups of insecure workers are key variables of interest in all 
the sub-studies. In sub-studies I and II, they consist of part-time workers, 
temporary employees, and low-skilled employees in the service sector. Sub-
study III concentrates on those types of workers and solo self-employed 
workers as well. On the other hand, sub-study IV scrutinises part-time 
permanent employees, part-time temporary workers, full-time temporary 
employees, and solo self-employed workers separately.
Each group was operationally defined as follows: First, the part-time 
employee refers to an employee whose working time is less than 35 hours per 
week in sub-studies I, III, and IV, while it is 30 hours per week in sub-study II. 
Sub-study II adopted a conservative approach to interpreting part-time 
workers because its design is a one country case study, while sub-studies I, III, 
and IV accepted a broader concept of part-time work considering variation 
among countries. Second, the temporary employee is an employee who has a 
fixed-term employment contract. Third, the low-skilled employee in the 
service sector refers to an employee who works in the service industry and 
whose highest level of education is ES-ISCED I or II.5 Finally, the solo self-
employed worker is a self-employed person who does not have an employee.
4.2.3 ADDITIONAL COVARIATES
Table 4 presents the covariates added to statistical models in each sub-
study. All models in all the sub-studies had gender, age and education level as 
common socio-economic covariates. In addition to those, sub-study I included 
the variables of age squared, immigrant, ethnic group, industry type, 
workplace type, union representativeness at the workplace and establishment 
size. Sub-study II had marital status, children, rural residence, industry type, 
provinces in Finland, and unemployment risk. In sub-study III, household 
type, public sector employment and frequency of attendance at religious 
services were included as control variables, while household income level and 
subjective likelihood of unemployment were additionally analysed to explore 
if they act as a mediator between being an insecure worker and UBI 
preferences. Finally, sub-study IV added the variables of public sector 
employment, frequency of religious service attendance, economic hardship 
5 The service industry refers to economic activities corresponding to the category number from 
45 to 97 except 84 in the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community (NACE) rev. 2.
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and subjective likelihood of unemployment to statistical models as control 
variables. 




Gender (male=0, female=1), Age (in years), Age squared
Education (five dummies: ES-ISCED I or II, IIIb, IIIa, IV, and V1 or V2)
Immigrant (citizen=0, immigrant=1), Ethnic group (major=0, minor=1)
Industry type (five dummies: manufacturing, construction, services, public 
administration and defence, and others), Workplace type (private=0, public=1)
Union representativeness at the workplace (from no unions or union 
members=0, little or no influence=1, through to a great deal of influence=4)
Establishment size (five dummies: under 10, 10 to 24, 25 to 99, 100 to 499, 
and 500 or more)
Ghent (country-level variable: no Ghent country=0, Ghent country=1)
II
Gender (male=0, female=1), Marital status (unmarried=0, married=1)
Children (no child=0, with children=1), Rural residence (urban=0, rural=1)
Age group (five dummies: under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64)
Education (four dummies: primary, upper secondary or vocational, polytechnic 
or lower university degree, and master’s or doctoral degree)
Industry type (fourteen dummies), Province (nineteen categories)
Unemployment risk* (continuous)
III
Gender (male=0, female=1), Age (in years)
Education (five dummies: ES-ISCED I or II, IIIb, IIIa, IV, and V1 or V2)
Household type (six dummies: two-earner couple with children, two-earner 
couple without children, one-earner couple with children, one-earner couple 
without children, single with children, and single without children)
Public sector employment (private worker=0, public sector worker=1)
Frequency of attendance at religious services (ranging from never=0, 
through to everyday=6)
Household income level (the bottom decile=1, through to the top decile=10)
Subjective likelihood of unemployment (likely to be unemployed during the 
next 12 months=1, otherwise=0)
IV
Gender (male=0, female=1), Age (in years)
Education (five dummies: ES-ISCED I or II, IIIb, IIIa, IV, and V1 or V2)
Children at home (no child at home=0, residing with children=1)
Public sector employment (private worker=0, public sector worker=1)
Frequency of attendance at religious services (ranging from never=0, 
through to everyday=6)
Economic hardship (living comfortably=1, through to very difficult to live=4) 
Subjective likelihood of unemployment (likely to be unemployed during the 
next 12 months=1, otherwise=0)
* The unemployment risk variable was constructed by estimating separate probit models for each year 
from 2000 to 2012 with the FIDS data.
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4.3 STATISTICAL MODELS
All the sub-studies estimated logistic regression models because all of their 
outcome variables are categorical ones. In addition, post-stratification and 
country weights were applied to all statistical models in sub-studies I, III and 
IV, and only the former ones were included for those in sub-study II, which is 
a single-country case study.
Sub-study I, which examined insecure workers’ union membership in 
23 countries, chose multilevel binary logistic regressions, as the statistical 
models for organised corporatism and social partnership regimes include the 
country-level variable to explain whether or not a country has the Ghent 
system. To examine insecure workers’ decision-making concerning union and 
unemployment insurance memberships in the Finnish Ghent system, sub-
study II estimated multinomial logistic regression models by using the pooled 
FIDS data from 2000 to 2012. Sub-studies III and IV estimated binary logistic 
regression models with clustered standard errors and country dummies to 




5.1 INSECURE WORKERS’ UNION MEMBERSHIP BY 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIME
Sub-study I focused on the unionisation of new social risk groups, including 
insecure workers (i.e., part-time workers, temporary employees, and low 
skilled service workers) and estimated five separate multilevel binary logistic 
models by each European IR regime. Table 5 illustrates the findings.  
In organised corporatism (Model 1-1), it is found that there is no 
association between any type of insecure work and union membership. The 
results on the social partnership regime (Model 1-2) reveal that temporary 
work affects union membership in a negative manner, while part-time work 
and low-skilled service employment do not make any significant difference. In 
both IR regimes, the findings show that being a female employee with children 
has a significantly positive effect on joining a union. When it comes to the 
polarised/state-centred regime (Model 1-3), part-time workers are found to be 
less likely to have union membership, but the other groups of insecure workers 
do not make a difference. The findings on the liberal regime (Model 1-4) 
demonstrate that being a part-time worker or temporary employee has a 
significantly negative impact on union membership, whereas being a low-
skilled service worker increases the probability of joining a union. In addition, 
it is found that single-parent employees, female employees with children, and 
female employees who care for vulnerable family members are more likely to 
have union membership in the liberal regime. Finally, according to the results 
on the transitional regime (Model 1-5), temporary workers and low-skilled 
service employees tend to be less unionised, but there is no significant 
evidence that being a part-time worker affects union membership. 
Given the above findings, H1a (i.e., in the liberal and transitional IR 
regimes, insecure workers are less likely to be union members than other 
employees) is partially supported. Contrary to expectation, being a low-skilled 
service worker in the liberal regime increases the probability of having union 
membership, and being a part-time employee in the transitional regime is not 
associated with unionisation. H1b (i.e., in the organised corporatism regime, 
social partnership and polarised/state-centred regimes, insecure workers are 
as likely to be union members as other workers) also finds partial support from 
the results. Although fixed-term contract workers in the social partnership 
regime and part-time employees in the polarised/state-centred regime tend to 
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be less unionised, but the other groups of insecure workers in the three IR 
regimes do not show a significant difference as expected.
Table 5 Multilevel binary logistic models on union membership by IR regimes
Variable








Part-time employee 0.81 (0.151) 0.76 (0.213) 0.67** (0.083) 0.76** (0.020) 1.16 (0.090)
Temporary employee 0.66 (0.263) 0.76* (0.131) 0.53 (0.401) 0.45** (0.097) 0.39** (0.172)
Low-skilled service employee 1.08 (0.673) 1.01 (0.066) 0.80 (0.142) 1.20* (0.091) 0.40** (0.183)
Family policy related worker
Single-parent employee 0.98 (0.316) 0.95 (0.226) 0.66 (0.455) 1.15** (0.031) 1.37 (0.171)
Female employee with children 1.28** (0.049) 1.47* (0.185) 0.86 (0.168) 2.13** (0.070) 1.17 (0.090)
Female employee who cares for 
vulnerable family members 1.78 (0.314) 1.15 (0.078) 1.31 (0.973) 2.21** (0.107) 1.25 (0.306)
Female 1.41** (0.077) 0.81** (0.060) 0.92 (0.082) 0.83** (0.003) 0.86 (0.087)
Age 1.22** (0.039) 1.00 (0.018) 1.26** (0.071) 1.03** (0.006) 1.16** (0.032)
Age squared 1.00** (0.000) 1.00 (0.000) 1.00** (0.001) 1.00 (0.000) 1.00** (0.000)
Education
ES-ISCED I or II 0.79 (0.652) 1.49 (0.208) 0.74 (0.168) 1.32* (0.073) 1.15 (0.221)
ES-ISCED IIIb 1.45 (0.275) 1.66* (0.257) 0.53** (0.122) 0.94 (0.077) 0.90 (0.095)
ES-ISCED IIIa Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
ES-ISCED IV 0.81** (0.044) 1.31 (0.230) 0.66 (0.482) 1.41** (0.044) 0.93 (0.336)
ES-ISCED V1 or V2 0.86 (0.165) 1.26 (0.330) 0.68 (0.361) 1.38** (0.077) 0.86 (0.136)
Immigrant 0.49* (0.287) 0.61 (0.311) 0.22** (0.371) 0.48** (0.177) 1.99 (0.627)
Minority ethnic group 1.31** (0.072) 0.75 (0.426) 0.78** (0.075) 1.73** (0.021) 1.27 (0.451)
Public sector 2.17* (0.353) 1.69** (0.120) 2.54** (0.105) 4.27** (0.084) 2.31** (0.215)
Union’s influence at workplace 1.63** (0.148) 1.78** (0.019) 1.95** (0.022) 2.70** (0.040) 2.27** (0.091)
Ghent system 3.68** (0.115) 7.75** (0.095) N/A N/A N/A
Number of observations 2,849 3,748 2,483 1,803 4,290
BIC 2,857.7 3524.5 1,890.1 1,705.5 2,672.8
Note: Odds ratios and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The estimates of industry type and 
establishment size dummy variables are not reported in the table.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
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5.2 INSECURE WORKERS’ UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
FINNISH GHENT SYSTEM
To investigate insecure workers’ choices about union and UI fund 
memberships in the transformed Finnish Ghent system, sub-study II 
conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis. Table 6 displays the 
analysis results as the marginal effects, rather than the coefficient estimates, 
to make the table easier to read.
First, the findings show that the marginal effect of part-time workers 
on non-membership of UI fund is significantly positive (13.3%). In contrast, 
the marginal effects of part-time workers on union membership and UI fund-
only membership are significantly negative, accounting for -9.1% and -4.3%, 
respectively. This means that part-time employees are more likely to give up 
having UI fund membership than full-time employees by refusing to join a
union or a UI fund. Second, it is found that temporary workers’ marginal effect 
on union membership is significantly negative, while those on non-
membership and UI fund-only membership are significantly positive. That is, 
having a fixed-term employment contract increases the probabilities of giving 
up UI fund membership and joining not a union but the independent UI fund 
at the same time. It is interesting that the marginal effect on non-membership 
(6.5%) is larger than that on UI fund-only membership (1.3%). Finally, the 
results reveal that low-skilled service workers’ marginal effects on non-
membership, union membership, and UI fund-only membership do not have 
a significant difference. Therefore, this can be interpreted to mean that being 
a low-skilled service employee does not affect the probabilities of having UI 
fund membership and choosing the independent UI fund instead of a trade 
union.
According to the findings, H2a (i.e., Being a part-time employee 
increases the probability of not joining a trade union or the independent UI 
fund), H2b (i.e., being a temporary employee increases the probability of 
having no UI membership, and at the same time the probability of joining the 
independent UI fund instead of a trade union), and H2c (i.e., being a low-
skilled worker in the service industry does not affect the probability of having 
UI membership, nor does it affect the probability of joining the independent 
UI fund instead of a trade union) are empirically supported in the analysis.
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2001 -0.3% -1.9% 2.2% 3.2 *
2002 -0.2% -4.3% 4.6% 13.6 **
2003 -1.8% -8.0% 9.8% 55.9 **
2004 -1.9% -8.4% 10.2% 61.3 **
2005 -2.2% -9.6% 11.8% 78.1 **
2006 -2.5% -8.3% 10.8% 67.1 **
2007 -1.4% -9.7% 11.1% 67.7 **
2008 -1.0% -14.0% 15.0% 97.9 **
2009 -3.4% -13.5% 16.9% 102.8 **
2010 -1.9% -14.8% 16.8% 120.2 **
2011 -1.5% -15.8% 17.2% 133.3 **
2012 -0.7% -16.1% 16.8% 131.9 **
Insecure worker
Part-time worker 13.3% -9.1% -4.3% 284.8 **
Temporary worker 6.5% -7.8% 1.3% 100.4 **
Low-skilled service worker -0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1
Control variables
Female -6.5% 8.0% -1.4% 226.3 **
Married -2.8% 3.0% -0.3% 40.6 **
Children -0.5% 0.6% -0.2% 1.3
Rural 3.2% -2.8% -0.4% 32.4 **
Unemployment risk -8.5% 30.1% -21.6% 3.6 *
Age
Aged less than 25 years 24.5% -17.1% -7.5% 446.2 **
Aged 25-34 7.0% -5.4% -1.7% 125.1 **
Aged 35-44 Ref.
Aged 45-54 -1.7% 4.2% -2.5% 33.95 **
Aged 55-64 -1.6% 6.0% -4.4% 50.0 **
Education
Primary education 9.8% -9.3% -0.5% 48.4 **
Upper secondary or vocational education 3.7% -4.0% 0.3% 28.2 **
Polytechnic or lower university degree Ref.
Master's or doctoral degree -2.2% 7.7% -5.5% 53.7 **
Note: Marginal effects are reported. The estimates of 19 regional and 14 industrial dummy variables are 
not reported in the table.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Ref. = reference category.
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5.3 INSECURE WORKERS’ PREFERENCES FOR 
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME
The main goal of sub-study III is to analyse the attitudes of four different 
groups of insecure workers (i.e., part-time, temporary, low-skilled service, and 
solo self-employed workers) towards the introduction of UBI schemes. To 
achieve this goal, the sub-study fitted binary logistic regression models with 
clustered standard errors and country dummies. Table 7 displays the estimates 
of the statistical models. 
According to Model 3-1, which can be used to evaluate hypotheses 3-1 
through 3-4, being a temporary employee has a significantly positive impact 
on UBI preferences. However, it is found that being a part-time worker, low-
skilled service employee, or solo self-employed worker does not affect a worker’ 
attitude towards UBI schemes. These results are robust when ordered logistic 
models and linear probability models with the original ordinal variable of basic 
income preferences are estimated. However, binary logistic models without 
weights indicate that both part-time employment and temporary work have 
significantly positive effects on UBI preferences.
The findings of models 3-2 to 3-4 show that household income and the 
subjective likelihood of unemployment, are significantly associated with UBI 
preferences and reduce the coefficient of temporary employment. In addition, 
as Table 8 illustrates, fixed-effects logistic models on these two factors indicate 
that having a temporary employment significantly lowers household income 
level and increases unemployment risk. Hence, it is found that being a 
temporary employee increases income insecurity and subjective 
unemployment risk, which, in turn, positively influence support for UBI 
schemes.
As a result, H3b (i.e. temporary employees are more likely to be more 
supportive of the introduction of UBI schemes than permanent employees), 
H3c (i.e. the attitudes of low-skilled service sector employees towards the 
introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different from those of other 
workers) and H3d (i.e. the attitudes of solo self-employed workers towards the 
introduction of UBI schemes are not significantly different from those of 
permanent employees) are supported by the findings. However, H3a (i.e. part-
time workers are more likely to be more supportive of the introduction of UBI 
schemes than full-time workers) does not receive support.
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Table 7 Logistic regression on UBI preferences with country fixed effects
Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 
Part-time employment 1.07 (0.063) 1.01 (0.036) 1.07 (0.059) 1.01 (0.037)
Low-skilled service work 0.92 (0.060) 0.93 (0.066) 0.92 (0.063) 0.93 (0.072)
Work type
Permanent employment Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Temporary employment 1.11 * (0.047) 1.07 (0.063) 0.99 (0.062) 1.00 (0.076)
Solo self-employment 1.06 (0.127) 1.07 (0.119) 1.05 (0.120) 1.05 (0.112)
Self-employment with employees 0.82 *** (0.046) 0.88 * (0.055) 0.84 ** (0.052) 0.89 (0.061)
Female 0.98 (0.039) 0.98 (0.046) 0.97 (0.036) 0.97 (0.043)
Age 0.99 *** (0.001) 0.99 *** (0.002) 0.99 *** (0.001) 0.99 *** (0.002)
Household type
Two-earner couple with kids Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Two-earner couple without kids 1.00 (0.047) 1.02 (0.045) 1.01 (0.047) 1.02 (0.047)
One-earner couple with kids 1.09 (0.055) 0.98 (0.054) 1.07 (0.048) 0.96 (0.050)
One-earner couple without kids 1.21 * (0.099) 1.07 (0.070) 1.20 * (0.099) 1.07 (0.069)
Single with kids 0.99 (0.087) 0.83 * (0.076) 0.98 (0.083) 0.82 * (0.079)
Single without kids 1.16 ** (0.050) 1.02 (0.045) 1.16 ** (0.054) 1.02 (0.046)
Education
ES-ISCED I or II 1.07 (0.043) 1.04 (0.067) 1.05 (0.047) 1.03 (0.065)
ES-ISCED IIIb 0.94 (0.063) 0.97 (0.081) 0.94 (0.058) 0.96 (0.080)
ES-ISCED IIIa Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
ES-ISCED IV 0.97 (0.065) 1.05 (0.089) 0.99 (0.065) 1.06 (0.089)
ES-ISCED V1 or V2 1.06 (0.081) 1.33 ** (0.122) 1.08 (0.087) 1.34 ** (0.127)
Public sector employment 1.03 (0.023) 1.02 (0.026) 1.05 (0.025) 1.03 (0.028)
Religious attendance 0.94 (0.031) 0.93 ** (0.025) 0.94 (0.030) 0.93 ** (0.025)
Household income
1st decile Ref. Ref.
2nd decile 1.05 (0.209) 1.04 (0.211)
3rd decile 1.01 (0.134) 1.02 (0.150)
4th decile 0.95 (0.103) 0.95 (0.106)
5th decile 0.86 (0.099) 0.85 (0.106)
6th decile 0.74 ** (0.082) 0.74 ** (0.082)
7th decile 0.75 ** (0.081) 0.77 * (0.092)
8th decile 0.70 * (0.100) 0.71 * (0.100)
9th decile 0.57 *** (0.069) 0.57 *** (0.075)
10th decile 0.49 *** (0.053) 0.50 *** (0.055)
Likelihood of unemployment 1.40 *** (0.114) 1.28 *** (0.102)
BIC 24,014.4 20,530.9 23,561.7 20,262.6
Number of observations 17,515 15,231 17,094 14,944
Log Likelihood -11,914.4 -10,164.3 -11,683.4 -10,030.4
Note: Odds ratios and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The estimates of 21 country 
dummy variables are not reported in the table.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
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Binary logistic model on the 
likelihood of unemployment
Part-time employment -0.578 *** (0.070) 0.212 (0.113)
Low-skilled service work 0.033 (0.215) -0.018 (0.152)
Work type
Permanent employment Ref. Ref.
Temporary employment -0.424 *** (0.088) 1.725 *** (0.225)
Solo self-employment -0.429 ** (0.134) 0.217 (0.124)
Self-employment with employees 0.328 ** (0.113) -0.160 (0.135)
Female -0.197 ** (0.062) 0.194 (0.104)
Age 0.006 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005)
Household type
Two-earner couple with kids Ref. Ref.
Two-earner couple without kids -0.287 *** (0.060) -0.051 (0.075)
One-earner couple with kids -1.116 *** (0.134) 0.445 *** (0.107)
One-earner couple without kids -1.344 *** (0.068) 0.151 (0.162)
Single with kids -1.948 *** (0.164) 0.280 ** (0.099)
Single without kids -1.587 *** (0.173) 0.194 *** (0.055)
Education
ES-ISCED I or II -1.002 *** (0.177) 0.397 * (0.182)
ES-ISCED IIIb -0.520 *** (0.051) 0.162 (0.139)
ES-ISCED IIIa Ref. Ref.
ES-ISCED IV 0.045 (0.064) -0.081 (0.201)
ES-ISCED V1 or V2 0.987 *** (0.054) -0.120 (0.129)
Public sector employment -0.054 (0.059) -0.672 *** (0.147)
Attendance at religious services -0.029 (0.031) -0.022 (0.035)
Number of observations 15,930 18,008
Log Likelihood -32,365.5 -6,887.7
BIC 64,924.5 13,961.5
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
36
5.4 INSECURE WORKERS’ PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT APPROACH TO UNEMPLOYMENT
Sub-study IV explored four types of insecure workers’ (i.e., part-time 
temporary, part-time permanent, full-time temporary, and solo self-employed 
workers) preferences for a social investment approach to unemployment via 
enhancing job training and education at a cost of reducing unemployment 
benefit. Fixed-effects binary logistic regression models with clustered 
standard errors were employed to analyse ESS Round 8 (2016) data. The 
findings are shown in Table 9. 
According to Model 4-1, which includes the independent and control 
variables, part-time permanent employment has a significantly positive effect, 
while part-time temporary employment is significantly negatively associated 
with the preferences for the social investment approach. By contrast, the 
results illustrate that having a full-time temporary employment does not have 
a significant impact. When it comes to solo self-employment, it is found that 
this form of insecure work is not significantly associated with the preferences 
compared to standard employment, which is the reference category in model 
4-1. However, its coefficient is significantly negative when the reference 
category is self-employment with employees. Additionally, models 4-2 
through to 4-4 demonstrate that economic hardship and the subjective 
likelihood of unemployment make no difference to the associations between 
being an insecure worker and social investment approach preferences. It is 
also found in all models that being an employer has a significantly positive 
effect on supporting the social investment approach, whereas being 
unemployed has a significantly negative impact.
Consequently, H4a (i.e. part-time permanent employees are more likely 
than standard employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits), H4b (part-time temporary employees are less likely 
than standard employees to support the social investment approach which 
aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits), and H4c (i.e. full-time temporary employees’ 
attitudes towards the social investment approach which aims to increase job 
training and education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits do 
not significantly differ from standard employees’ attitudes) are supported by 
the findings. Regarding solo self-employed workers, H4d (i.e., solo self-
employed workers are more likely than standard employees to support the 
social investment approach which aims to increase job training and education 
at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits reduction) does not 
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receive support, while H4e (i.e., solo self-employed workers are less likely than 
employers to support the social investment approach which aims to increase 
job training and education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits) 
is supported in the analysis.
Table 9 Logistic regression on preferences for the social investment 
approach to unemployment
Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 Model 4-4 
Work type
Permanent full-time (standard) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Part-time permanent 1.11 *** (0.033) 1.11 *** (0.031) 1.12 *** (0.032) 1.11 *** (0.030)
Part-time temporary 0.58 *** (0.088) 0.58 *** (0.090) 0.59 *** (0.086) 0.59 ** (0.090)
Full-time temporary 1.06 (0.081) 1.08 (0.071) 1.09 (0.078) 1.10 (0.074)
Solo self-employment 0.99 (0.130) 0.99 (0.134) 1.00 (0.125) 1.00 (0.128)
Self-employment with employees 1.27 * (0.122) 1.26 * (0.135) 1.30 ** (0.128) 1.29 * (0.139)
Unemployment 0.64 *** (0.042) 0.71 *** (0.065) 0.64 *** (0.053) 0.69 ** (0.082)
Female 0.89 * (0.050) 0.90 (0.053) 0.90 (0.056) 0.91 (0.058)
Age 0.99 ** (0.004) 0.99 ** (0.004) 0.99 ** (0.003) 0.99 ** (0.004)
Education
ES-ISCED I or II 0.87 (0.106) 0.91 (0.106) 0.86 (0.107) 0.90 (0.106)
ES-ISCED IIIb 0.89 (0.067) 0.90 (0.070) 0.88 (0.067) 0.90 (0.069)
ES-ISCED IIIa Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
ES-ISCED IV 1.09 (0.099) 1.11 (0.101) 1.10 (0.100) 1.11 (0.103)
ES-ISCED V1 or V2 1.01 (0.071) 1.00 (0.068) 1.01 (0.068) 1.00 (0.063)
Having children 1.05 (0.031) 1.06 (0.033) 1.05 (0.034) 1.06 (0.036)
Religious attendance 1.08 *** (0.013) 1.08 *** (0.013) 1.08 *** (0.014) 1.08 *** (0.014)
Economic hardship
Living comfortably Ref. Ref.
Coping with living 0.86 ** (0.051) 0.86 * (0.051)
Difficult to live 0.86 (0.081) 0.86 (0.082)
Very difficult to live 0.59 *** (0.090) 0.60 ** (0.106)
Likelihood of unemployment 0.94 (0.071) 0.96 (0.066)
BIC 23,127.3 22,986.0 22,383.1 22,259.9
Number of observations 19,144 19,065 18,408 18,345
Log Likelihood -11,494.6 -11,409.2 -11,117.9 -11,041.6
Note: Odds ratios and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The estimates of 21 country 
dummy variables are not reported in the table.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS
This dissertation aimed to contribute to an understanding of insecure workers’ 
preferences for union membership and alternative social policy ideas in post-
industrial European welfare states. The findings demonstrate that there is 
considerable variation in their decision-making concerning union 
membership and support for the introduction of new social policy approaches 
by the group of insecure workers. Moreover, the results of this study illustrate 
that IR regimes and the reform of the Ghent system are significant factors 
influencing insecure workers’ union membership status. 
Sub-study I compared three groups of insecure workers’ union 
membership by European IR regime. Contrary to the earlier literature showing 
the general trend that insecure workers such as flexible employees are less 
unionised (Ebbinghaus, 2007; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011), this sub-study 
illustrated that insecure workers’ inclination to join a union varies according 
to their form of work and IR regime which they belong to. Table 10 summarises 
the analysis results. In organised corporatism, none of the insecure worker 
groups shows a difference from other employees. On the other hand, 
temporary employees in the social partnership regime and part-time 
employees in the polarised/state-centred regime are less likely to be unionised. 
In the liberal regime, part-time workers and fixed-term employees are more 
likely to decline to join a union, whereas low-skilled service workers tend to be 
more unionised than other employees. Finally, temporary workers and low-
skilled service employees in the transitional regime are less likely to have 
union membership.
Sub-study II contributed to the literature on the Ghent system. Recent 
studies mainly concentrate on the decline in union density caused by the 
reforms of the Ghent system in the Nordic countries (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 
2006; Høgedahl and Kongshøj, 2017; Kjellberg, 2006; Lind, 2009; Van Rie et 
al., 2011), but this sub-study demonstrated how the institutional 
transformation has influenced insecure workers’ decision making related to 
union and UI fund memberships by analysing the Finnish case. Table 11 
recapitulates the findings and displays that insecure workers’ choices vary 
according to the type of work they have. Both part-time and temporary 
employees are inclined to have no union membership. Such a tendency is more 
noticeable for the former than the latter. Meanwhile, part-time workers are 
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unlikely to enrol in the independent UI fund, but temporary employees tend 
to prefer the independent UI fund to a union when they want to have UI fund 
membership. When it comes to low-skilled service workers, there is no 
evidence that they make significantly different choices from other employees.
Table 10 Associations between insecure worker groups and union 
membership by IR regime





Part-time employees NS NS – – NS
Temporary employees NS – NS – –
Low-skilled
service employees NS NS NS + –
Note: + = more likely to have union membership; – = more unlikely to have union membership; NS = no 
significant difference
Table 11 Insecure workers’ choices about union and UI fund memberships in 
the Finnish Ghent system
Insecure worker group Non-membership Union membership UI fund-onlymembership
Part-time employees + + + + + – – – – –
Temporary employees + + – – – +
Low-skilled
service employees NS NS NS
Note: + = more likely to choose the option; – = more unlikely to choose the option; NS = no significant 
difference; the number of symbols means relative marginal effects based on the regression 
estimates.
Sub-study III identified novel findings of insecure worker groups’ 
attitudes towards the introduction of UBI schemes in European welfare states. 
A summary of the results is presented on the left side of Table 12. Even though 
it is argued that UBI would help alleviate insecure workers’ economic risks 
(Standing, 2012; Van Parijs, 2004), this sub-study revealed that only 
temporary employees tend to have more favourable attitudes towards UBI 
among different groups of insecure workers. In this regard, it was found that 
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income and subjective employment insecurity serve as mediators between 
temporary employment and UBI preferences. In contrast, the findings did not 
provide evidence that being a part-time worker, low-skilled service employee, 
or solo self-employed worker would strengthen workers’ preferences for UBI 
schemes.
Sub-study IV contributed to the recent discussion on public opinion on 
the social investment paradigm by analysing insecure workers’ preferences for 
the policy increasing the opportunities for job training and education at the 
cost of unemployment benefit reduction. Many studies analysing public 
support for social investment as an alternative social policy idea rarely 
assumed a trade-off between the public expenditures on social investment and 
social protection. However, this sub-study postulated the budgetary trade-off 
scenario to capture public opinion on social investment in a more realistic 
situation. The key findings are summed up on the right side of Table 12. First, 
there is a stark difference between part-time permanent and part-time 
temporary employees. The former group is inclined to be more supportive of 
the social investment approach, whereas the latter group is less likely to 
support it. Meanwhile, full-time temporary employees and solo self-employed 
workers do not exhibit significantly different preferences from standard 
employees. However, it should be noted that the solo self-employed are less 
supportive of the policy approach than employers.
Table 12 Preferences for UBI schemes and the social investment approach to 
unemployment




Part-time employees NS Part-time permanent employees +









Note: + = more likely to support; – = more unlikely to support; NS = no significant difference; reference 
category is standard employees.
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6.2 INSECURE WORKERS’ UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
According to OECD (2020) statistics, trade union density has been declining 
gradually in most European countries since the early 1990s. In general, it is 
believed that the prevalence of insecure employment and the growth of low-
skilled service jobs stimulated this phenomenon. However, the findings of this 
study make important qualifications to this general perspective.
First, in organised corporatism, social partnership, and 
polarised/state-centred regimes, where collective bargaining coverage is wide, 
the high level of coverage tends to reduce insecure workers’ reluctance to be 
unionised. However, its mitigating effect seems to be limited because 
temporary employees in the social partnership regime and part-time workers 
in the polarised/state-centred regime show a significantly lower union density. 
Considering that none of the three insecure worker groups are less unionised 
than other employees in organised corporatism, it seems that there must be 
some special factors that attract insecure workers to unions. A possible 
explanation is that, in this regime, various institutions run by universalistic 
welfare states function as a power resource for unions (Korpi, 2006). 
Additionally, strong legislative support has been established for unions, which 
usually play a key role in representing employees in the workplace (Furåker 
and Bengtsson, 2013). These features of organised corporatism generally 
promote the unionisation of insecure workers. 
In addition, contrary to expectation, it was found that low-skilled 
service workers in the liberal regime are more unionised than other employees. 
The recent literature on trade unions’ responses and strategies against low 
quality jobs in the service sectors provides evidence to explain this 
phenomenon. Pedersini’s (2010) report illustrates that, in the 2000s, trade 
unions in Cyprus, Ireland, and the UK attempted to advocate for and recruit 
as new members workers in the low-paying service industries such as the 
wholesale and retail trade, cleaning and catering services, and that they 
succeeded in improving union density in these sectors. Burgess et al. (2013), 
Murphy and Turner (2014), and Simms (2017) also show that, in the UK and 
Ireland, trade unions have made steady efforts to improve the working 
conditions of vulnerable employees in low-quality service jobs. From this case, 
it can be concluded that conscious mobilisation efforts by unions can 
successfully widen their membership base. In fact, since the 2000s, union 
strategies for workers who have non-standard employment or low skills have 
been changed across Europe (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2017; Keune 
and Pedaci, 2020). It is often argued that these workers are labour market 
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outsiders whose interests are barely protected by unions (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 2002; Rueda, 2007), but nowadays many unions focus on 
simultaneously protecting standard employees’ rights and improving insecure 
workers’ working conditions (Keune and Pedaci, 2020). Therefore, if unions 
maintain or intensify strategies to advocate the interests of low-skilled service 
workers and non-standard employees, a considerable number of insecure 
workers would probably take a positive view of unions’ role and express their 
solidarity with them, despite recent unfavourable structural labour movement 
trends.
Analysis of the FIDS data demonstrated that workers in part-time or 
temporary employment are reluctant to join trade unions in the Ghent system, 
even though Finland belongs to the organised corporatism regime, where 
these types of employees are as likely as other workers to be unionised. This 
means that an exception can be made among countries based on that IR 
regime when they operate a union-linked UI scheme. Unemployment benefits 
are paid only to those unemployed who meet a qualifying period and minimum 
income requirement during the course of their employment. The stricter these 
requirements are, the more likely temporary or part-time employees are to feel 
that they cannot use the UI services provided by unions in the Ghent system. 
In this way, those groups of insecure workers can be less unionised even in a 
country based on organised corporatism, although the Ghent system seems 
more effective at recruiting workers in standard employment than mandatory 
UI schemes. Hence, there should be a consideration of how to amend their UI 
system, should Finnish trade unions aim to gradually embrace the increasing 
number of insecure workers. In addition, as it is predicted that the proportions 
of part-timers and fixed-term employees will increase in the post-industrial 
economy, it seems that the Ghent system has limitations in mobilising
workers—at least in Finland. To prevent a lasting union density decline, 
therefore, unions need to establish new institutions and strategies to 
successfully attract insecure workers (Bryson et al., 2011).
6.3 INSECURE WORKERS’ HETEROGENEOUS SOCIAL 
POLICY PREFERENCES
The findings indicate that insecure workers’ attitudes towards UBI and the 
social investment approach to unemployment reflect their different interests 
and circumstances. Regarding the introduction of UBI preferences, only 
temporary employees show a more positive attitude. On the other hand, while 
part-time permanent employees are more favourable to the social investment 
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approach, part-time temporary workers have a less positive attitude towards 
it. Although other insecure worker groups do not show a significant difference 
in their preferences, it should be noted that the reasons behind these opinions 
may be different.
According to the analysis results, temporary workers’ support for UBI 
can be explained by the lower-level household income and job insecurity that 
they tend to experience. On the other hand, part-time employees, and solo self-
employed workers, who do not experience subjective unemployment risks 
despite their low household income levels, do not show any difference from 
full-time workers and permanent employees, respectively. As a result, it would 
appear that low household income is not a sufficient incentive for insecure 
workers to support UBI schemes. Another possible explanation for the 
unexpected preferences of part-timers is that, because part-time jobs remain 
dominated by women (Horemans and Marx, 2013)—who are unlikely to be the 
main breadwinners in their households—part-time workers might worry that 
the introduction of a UBI scheme could lead to a tax increase, resulting in a 
reduction in net household income. It is interesting that solo self-employed 
workers’ preferences for UBI are not significantly different from those of 
permanent employees, but are clearly distinct from those of employers, who 
are more likely to have negative attitudes. This implies that the UBI 
preferences of solo self-employed workers reflect their mixed socioeconomic 
status of potential employer and insecure worker. This case supports the 
argument that their attitude towards welfare differs from that of the self-
employed, who are considered to be petite bourgeoisie (Jansen, 2019).
When it comes to insecure workers’ attitudes towards the social 
investment idea, the findings demonstrate a stark contrast between part-time 
permanent and part-time temporary employees in a budgetary trade-off 
scenario between job training and unemployment benefit. The former group 
is more supportive, whereas the latter shows less support than that expressed 
by standard employees. Furthermore, it has been found that people in part-
time temporary employment have a similar attitude as the unemployed in this 
regard. Unexpectedly, full-time temporary workers do not differ from the 
reference group. As a result, it seems that temporary work does not, by itself, 
affect the preference for the social investment approach in the budgetary 
trade-off assumption. However, once combined with a part-time contract, this 
type of employment appears to have a negative impact on individual support. 
The reason part-time temporary employees show relatively negative attitudes 
may be that they would face the highest level of income insecurity among those 
groups if such a policy were implemented. Worries about upcoming economic 
hardship would overpower their need to upskill. Solo self-employed workers 
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show the same pattern as they do in UBI preferences. Their attitudes towards 
the social investment approach do not differ from those of standard employees, 
but show an obvious difference from those of employers, who are more likely 
to support it. Thus, it can be concluded that employers and solo self-employed 
workers show significant disparities in political opinion concerning how to 
conduct welfare reforms as well.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS
Are insecure workers less likely to join trade unions? Are they more likely to 
support new social policy ideas, such as UBI and social investment? This study 
shows that there is no simple answer to these questions. In other words, 
insecure workers’ commitments to unions and policy preferences vary 
considerably with the type of employment or the institutional background to 
which they belong. It is often said that the rise of insecure workers is a huge 
threat to trade unions, and these workers desire new welfare states more 
keenly than standard workers do. However, the findings of this dissertation 
show that such claims may make the mistake of hasty generalisations based 
only on regional or local phenomena. Simply put, it can be concluded that 
insecure workers are a heterogeneous group, at least as far as the issues related 
to their interests in the labour market and welfare systems are concerned. For 
this reason, the approach of lumping them all into one cluster that is then 
compared to secure workers can cause substantial difficulties in 
understanding the real picture of their labour movement-related behaviours 
and welfare preferences. Moreover, although the political economy literature 
focuses mainly on unemployment risk, this study demonstrates that it is also 
necessary to consider insecure workers’ job insecurity, income insecurity, and 
exclusion from existing social security together in exploring their political 
preferences. In the same context, policy measures, which can be elaborately 
designed in consideration of their different risks, interests, and preferences, 
would be effective in alleviating the troubles that insecure workers suffer from.
Considering the findings, it seems difficult to expect that insecure 
workers would stand in solidarity to cooperatively respond to the diverse 
threats they face in the post-industrial labour market. Trade unions are not 
attractive to all types of insecure workers, and new social policy ideas are not 
always beneficial for protecting or improving their interests. In addition, 
insecure workers show different preferences for both pro-welfare policies and 
left-wing political parties according to their work type (Jansen, 2019). As the 
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gig economy developed dramatically in recent years (Vallas and Schor, 2020), 
it became inevitable that platform workers would form a separate insecure 
worker group, and their working conditions and employment status would be 
different from those of existing insecure workers. These tendencies imply the 
possibility that the tension or competition between insecure workers may 
become intense, as the number of permanent employment opportunities has 
decreased, and the volume of insecure workers is likely to gradually increase. 
However, it is unlikely that such changes will be beneficial for resolving their 
insecurity issues in a post-industrial society, where it is predicted that workers’ 
economic insecurity will rise even more. Thus, to overcome the various 
problems they have suffered from, it is necessary to attempt to determine how 
insecure workers can unite, even though this may be a complex task.
Despite these contributions, this study has some limitations. First, the 
operational definition of insecure worker groups depends on employment type, 
industry sector, and education level. Although this study adopted this 
definition to cover and compare various groups of insecure workers, there are 
different ways to define or categorise the concept. For instance, Olsthoorn 
(2014) proposed a method to measure precarious employment by using a 
variety of factors such as wage, unemployment benefit entitlements, contract 
type, and unemployment duration. Hence, future studies could define insecure 
workers based on measurements of the diverse types of risks experienced by 
individual workers. A second shortcoming arises from the fact that IR regimes 
are not static but are in a state of change. In European countries, trade unions 
have strived to understand the divergent needs of insecure workers and to 
advocate their interests in recent years. In addition, the transformation of the 
Ghent system has caused a gradual change in union membership and
employment relations, even in the Nordic region. Consequently, future studies 
on insecure workers’ unionisation should consider the impacts of the changing 
features of IR regimes. To do so, it is necessary to analyse repeated cross-
national survey data or panel data for a certain country combining country-
level variables associated with IR characteristics. Third, as sub-study II 
analysed only the Finnish setting, future studies are required to look further 
into the Danish and Swedish cases to draw relevant conclusions about insecure 
workers’ unionisation in the Ghent system from a comparative perspective. In 
addition, comparisons between Norway and the Ghent countries should also 
be investigated to gain a deeper understanding of insecure workers’ union 
membership in the organised corporatism IR regime. Fourth, due to data 
limitations, this dissertation was unable to include platform workers, who 
have recently been growing rapidly in number, in analysing insecure workers’ 
attitudes towards new social policy ideas. Finally, there is still very little 
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knowledge about the effects of institutional features related to welfare states 
on insecure workers’ welfare attitudes, even though it is important 
information for evidence-based decision making. Therefore, in future, the 
interactions between individual preferences and institutional factors must be 
addressed through more in-depth analyses.
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The effects of non-standard work and labour market policy 
spending on preferences for social investment policy 
regarding unemployment: A multilevel study of 20 
European countries 
 
Young-Kyu Shin, Teemu Kemppainen and Zhen Im 
 
Abstract 
This study explores labour force participants’ attitudes towards the social investment approach 
to unemployment in a budgetary trade-off scenario, focusing on non-standard employment and 
labour market policy expenditure impacts. It analyses a dataset combining European Social 
Survey Round 8 data (2016) and country-level variables, revealing that workers’ preferences 
for increased job training (social investment) through unemployment benefits cutbacks vary by 
form of employment. The findings demonstrate that part-time permanent employment 
positively relates to these preferences, whereas part-time temporary work is negatively 
associated. However, full-time temporary employment is not found to have a significant 
influence. Although the solo self-employed do not significantly differ from standard employees, 
they support the social investment policy less than employers. Finally, the results indicate that 
lower job training expenditure tends to motivate workers to support it, while the ratio of social 
protection spending to total labour market policy expenditure positively affects workers’ 
preferences. 





Today, social investment is one of the main themes in the policy debate surrounding welfare 
reform. Indeed, European welfare states have extended social investment policies – such as 
childcare, education and vocational training – in response to new social risks which existing 
welfare programmes often fail to address in a post-industrial society (Bonoli, 2007; Esping-
Andersen, 2002; Hemerijck, 2015; Kuitto, 2016; Morel et al., 2012). Reflecting this trend, 
many recent studies analyse individual preferences for social investment policies, 
demonstrating that the public highly support the paradigm in general (Busemeyer and 
Neimanns, 2017; Garritzmann et al., 2018). A considerable volume of research examines 
preferences for social investment ideas or policies, but the attitudes of workers in non-standard 
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employment – who tend to face higher unemployment risk but have fewer job opportunities 
and less protection from existing social security programmes (Bonoli, 2005; Cutuli and Guetto, 
2013; Forrier and Sels, 2003; Pedersini and Coletto, 2009; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008) 
– are seldom examined. In addition, although social investment policies for the unemployed 
are closely associated with labour market policies (LMPs), research on institutional LMP 
factors influencing workers’ preferences for social investment is scarce. Hence, to fill these 
knowledge gaps, this study aims to examine how different types of non-standard employment 
and governments’ LMP spending affect workers’ attitudes towards the social investment 
approach to joblessness in European welfare states.  
 Over the last couple of decades, the most topical issue in the debate on European LMPs 
has been the spread of activation programmes that enforce welfare conditionality and impose 
sanctions upon individuals who fail to meet the conditions (Buss, 2019a; Fossati, 2018; Knotz, 
2018). Although activation or workfare policies are types of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs), they cannot easily be regarded as part of the social investment approach because 
they contribute very little investment in human capital (Boloni, 2012). In the same vein, 
Garritzmann et al. (2018) show that the public also differentiate between workfare and social 
investment policies. On the other hand, upskilling the unemployed via vocational training is 
the most social investment–oriented ALMP, a traditionally popular intervention in the Nordic 
region (Bonoli, 2012; Hemerijck, 2018; Morel et al., 2012). In recent years, as reports have 
gradually shown that workfare policies tend to negatively affect jobseekers’ economic 
situations and well-being while also increasing precarious employment (Murphy, 2020; 
Raffass, 2017; Seikel and Spannagel, 2018; Wright et al., 2020), criticism of workfare has 
increased. In this situation, upskilling programmes can offer a promising alternative as a social 
investment approach to replace punitive activation models. Thus, the current study focuses on 
opinions about job training and education enhancements, not general ALMPs. 
In the era of permanent austerity (Pierson, 1998), budgetary limitations are among the 
largest obstacles to pursuing welfare reform by significantly expanding vocational training and 
education because they sometimes require a trade-off between social investment and social 
protection in (LMP) expenditures (Bengtsson et al., 2017). Thus, increased investment in 
vocational training could lead to a reduction in unemployment benefits. Moreover, Busemeyer 
and Garritzmann (2017) and Neimanns et al. (2018) illustrate that public support for social 
investment is even lower in budgetary trade-off situations between social investment versus 
social protection. Therefore, this study also assumes a budgetary trade-off between investments 
in upskilling programmes and expenditure for unemployment benefits, and it explores 
economically active people’s preferences for social investment policy regarding 
unemployment. 
This study’s first objective is to examine non-standard employment’s effects on 
preferences for the social investment approach to unemployment. In contrast to standard work 
based on permanent and full-time contracts, non-standard work, is an important theme of the 
post-industrial labour market, having become dominant in most welfare states. It commonly 
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includes temporary employment, part-time employment and solo self-employment (Kalleberg, 
2000, 2009; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008), and non-standard workers are likely to face 
a higher risk of unemployment and lower income compared to standard employees 
(Emmenegger, 2009; Marx and Picot, 2013; Rueda, 2005). Because material self-interests tend 
to affect individual preferences for social investment in situations with budgetary constraints 
(Neimanns et al., 2018), non-standard workers might have different attitudes from standard 
employees. 
Its second goal is to analyse how governmental expenditures on LMPs affect workers’ 
attitudes towards social investment for the unemployed. It is an important area of comparative 
studies on welfare attitudes to explore the relationship between institutions and policy 
preferences. To contribute to this discussion, this article concentrates on LMP spending. The 
proportions of expenditures on social investment policies and passive labour market policies 
(PLMPs) may influence perceptions of a country’s LMPs which, in turn, could affect 
preferences for the social investment approach in budgetary trade-off scenarios. 
To achieve these research objectives, this study estimates logistic regression models 
using a dataset which combines microdata from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 8 
and country-level data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Prior to statistical analysis, this article reviews the relevant literature and proposes 
hypotheses in its second section. Section 3 then explains the study’s data and methods, and 
Section 4 demonstrates the analysis results and verifies the hypotheses. Finally, this article 





2.1 A trade-off between different types of welfare policies 
Recent studies identify three main types of welfare policies employed in most mature welfare 
states today (Beramendi et al., 2015; Bonoli, 2013; Fossati, 2018; Torfing, 1999): passive 
social insurance, social investment, and workfare. Passive social insurance refers to social 
transfers, such as workers’ unemployment benefits, which aim to compensate and restore 
workers’ lost income when they become unemployed, elderly, or ill (Beramendi et al., 2015). 
In contrast, the benefits of social investment policies generally accrue only over the longer term 
(Beramendi et al., 2015; Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2018). They aim to improve human capital 
through education and training programmes, which may improve workers’ labour market 
prospects and then result in better employment and wage opportunities. The third family of 
welfare policies, workfare, have also become commonplace (Bengtsson et al., 2017; Buss, 
2019b; Deeming, 2015; Fossati, 2018). Workfare policies assign stringent conditions to benefit 
recipiency and impose sanctions when such conditions are not fulfilled. For instance, workfare 
policies may require unemployed workers to accept lower or mismatched jobs, and their 
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rejection of such jobs may result in cuts to their unemployment benefits (Fossati, 2018; Knotz, 
2018). Workfare aims to pressure and precipitate unemployed workers into reemployment.  
Although mature welfare states’ governments employ all three types of welfare policies, 
they must frequently adjudicate on which policies they would like to fund most (Beramendi et 
al., 2015; Cantillon, 2011) because mature welfare states face the pressure of permanent 
austerity. If they spend more on some policies, they might need to cut spending on other 
policies in order to contain costs. Cantillon (2011) notes that European governments decreased 
passive compensations when they expanded their social investment policies per the European 
Commission’s Lisbon Strategy (EC, 2013) recommendations. Likewise, Bengtsson et al. (2017) 
show that many European welfare states reduced their expenditure on costlier social investment 
policies, such as training, but increased spending on cheaper workfare policies in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 Great Financial Recession. Thus, mature welfare states must consider 
trade-offs in welfare spending whenever they prioritise one type of policy. 
Such trade-offs may have political implications (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). Public 
preferences may not mirror the government’s policy direction. Even if the public support each 
individual welfare policy (Garritzmann et al., 2018), governments may still favour some 
policies over others when compelled to prioritise spending for particular policies. In other 
words, spending pressures may compel the public to consider which policies they wish to 
protect at the expense of other policies. In this context, workers may choose according to their 
labour market position – for example, they may be less inclined to cut spending for the policies 
that most benefit them. Conversely, workers may be more inclined to cut spending for the 
policies that least benefit them. Although the welfare state literature thoroughly examines 
workers’ support for each of the three welfare policy types individually (Häusermann et al., 
2015; Rehm, 2009), it delves less into workers’ trade-off in weighing these policies against one 
another. Far less is known about different workers’ preferred spending allocations for these 
different welfare policies. In particular, the current study focuses on workers’ preferred trade-
off between passive unemployment benefit and social investment. Studying trade-off 
preferences regarding these two welfare policies is relevant because European governments 
have expanded workfare at the expense of social protection and social investment schemes 
– especially since the austerity measures imposed during the 2008 Great Financial Crisis 
(Bengtsson et al., 2017). Trade-offs between passive social protection and social investment 
may be even starker, when these policies face social spending cuts. Thus, investigating workers’ 
preferences regarding such trade-offs is relevant.  
 
2.2 Non-standard workers’ preferences for the social investment approach to 
unemployment 
The literature demonstrates that the unemployed tend to support increasing public spending for 
unemployment benefits rather than education policy (Garritzmann et al., 2018) and have less 
favourable attitudes towards activation or workfare programmes than employees because such 
programmes emphasise their responsibilities to participate in the labour market, rather than 
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their social rights (Buss, 2019a, 2019b; Fossati, 2018). Social investment policy aims to equip 
the unemployed with upgraded job skills, but it is also likely to stress their commitments to 
upskilling. Moreover, if unemployment benefits must be cut in order to implement a social 
investment policy, the unemployed would immediately lose income. Hence, unemployed 
workers are expected to be less likely to favour a social investment approach, given the 
budgetary trade-off situation. In stark contrast, employers would have more supportive 
attitudes in this situation because they can benefit from the social investment policy, which 
facilitates their recruitment of a more skilled workforce. Previous studies demonstrate that 
employers are not only proponents of but also main actors in activation and workfare 
programmes (Van Berkel, 2017). Because they usually play an important role in implementing 
job training programmes, which are the essence of social investment for the unemployed, 
employers have no reason to take a negative stance towards such programmes. 
Given that the majority of non-standard workers face a higher unemployment risk 
comparted to standard employees, their preferences will probably fall between those of the 
unemployed and employers, who are more likely to adopt the opposite stance. Although non-
standard workers share common features – such as lower protection and unstable labour market 
status – they exhibit heterogeneous political preferences and welfare attitudes, according to 
their employment types (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Jansen, 2019; Marx and Picot, 2013; 
Marx, 2014). Therefore, to explore non-standard workers’ preferences regarding social 
investment policy, the current study divides these workers into four groups: permanent part-
time employees, temporary part-time employees, temporary full-time employees and solo self-
employed workers. 
Part-time jobs are mainly undertaken by people who need to simultaneously work and 
care for family members or acquire education for future careers (Horemans and Marx, 2013). 
Thus, many part-timers likely want to become full-time employees after their current personal 
tasks terminate. However, part-time employees usually have shorter job tenures and suffer from 
limited employment opportunities (Horemans and Marx, 2013). Because the social investment 
approach would help them overcome these problems, they would likely adopt a positive view 
of a policy that would increase job training and education. On the other hand, their attitudes 
towards reducing unemployment benefit in order to shoulder such programmes’ costs would 
depend on whether their employment contracts are permanent or temporary. Part-time 
permanent workers are likely less sensitive to such reductions due to their relatively low 
unemployment risks. On the contrary, part-time temporary workers are more likely to adopt a 
negative stance because they face higher incidences of unemployment and at the same time, 
their unemployment benefits, which relate to their current earnings, are probably much lower 
than full-time workers’ ones. For part-time workers who depend on fixed-term contracts, this 
potential income loss may be a powerful disincentive against the social investment approach. 
As a result, in the budgetary trade-off situation, it is hypothesised that part-time permanent 
employees are more likely to support the social investment approach than standard workers, 
whereas part-time temporary workers are less likely to support. 
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A reduction in unemployment benefits would likely be an undesirable suggestion for 
full-time workers in fixed-term employment, but their negative reactions would likely be 
weaker than those of part-time temporary employees because full-time workers’ 
unemployment benefits are higher in an earnings-related unemployment insurance system. On 
the other hand, some factors may cause full-time temporary workers to adopt a positive attitude 
towards the social investment approach. Since they have fewer training opportunities than 
standard workers – which makes further developing their employability difficult (Cutuli and 
Guetto, 2013; Forrier and Sels, 2003) – they may feel that policies which aim to expand 
vocational education and training are beneficial. Moreover, most temporary employees’ 
ultimate goal is to gain permanent employment (De Jong et al., 2009). To achieve this objective, 
they may be willing to sacrifice some unemployment benefits for job training and education. 
Consequently, full-time temporary workers are expected not to have significantly different 
attitudes towards the social investment approach from standard employees because the positive 
and negative factors influencing their preferences may compensate each other. Given all these 
points, this study’s hypotheses regarding part-time and temporary employees are as follows: 
 
H1: Part-time permanent employees are more likely than standard employees to 
support the social investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits. 
H2: Part-time temporary employees are less likely than standard employees to 
support the social investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits. 
H3: Full-time temporary employees’ attitudes towards the social investment approach 
which aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits do not significantly differ from standard employees’ 
attitudes. 
  
Solo self-employed workers’ socioeconomic status differs from the self-employed, who 
are commonly called ‘petty bourgeois’ (Arum and Müller, 2004). As most solo entrepreneurs 
have low-skilled jobs in the service industry (Jansen, 2019), their vulnerable status often 
obliges them to face a higher risk of unemployment and suffer irregular incomes as well as 
exclusion from the social security system (Dekker, 2010; Jansen, 2019; Schulze Buschoff and 
Protsch, 2008). Although they are potential employers, in such a situation, solo self-employed 
workers seem unlikely to be as favourable as employers towards reducing unemployment 
benefits. Furthermore, the social investment approach would not be immediately useful in 
employing workers since generally solo self-employed workers do not have employees because 
of difficulty expanding their business, rather than a shortage in the available skilled workforce. 
However, a different perspective suggests that since the social investment approach could give 
such precarious businesspersons more opportunities to undertake vocational training and 
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education, it could attract them. Hence, solo self-employed workers are likely to support the 
social investment approach more than standard employees but less than employers. Therefore, 
this study’s hypotheses regarding solo self-employed workers are as follows: 
 
H4a: Solo self-employed workers are more likely than standard employees to support 
the social investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits reduction. 
H4b: Solo self-employed workers are less likely than employers to support the social 
investment approach which aims to increase job training and education at the 
cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits. 
 
2.3 Effects of labour market policy expenditure  
In addition to self-interest, how a country spends its budget on unemployment issues can affect 
workers’ attitudes towards the social investment approach to unemployment in the budgetary 
trade-off situation because they are likely to have their own opinions on reforming the 
government’s current LMPs for the public good. 
Economic analyses reveal that public expenditure on ALMPs helps reduce 
unemployment rates; in particular, investments in vocational training – which usually account 
for most of this expenditure – have an effect over time by increasing human capital (Card et 
al., 2010; Escudero, 2018; Hotz et al., 2006). These findings align with public expectations that 
training will upgrade employability. Thus, the current study predicts that on average, people in 
a country, which allocates a smaller portion of its budget to job training and education, will 
likely think their country must increase spending on such programmes in order to provide the 
unemployed with more training opportunities, even if part of their unemployment benefits is 
sacrificed. Thus, this study’s first hypothesis regarding LMP expenditure is as follows: 
 
H5: The lower a country’s expenditure on job training, the more its workers support 
the social investment approach which aims to increase job training and education 
at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits. 
  
The proportion of expenses for welfare benefits associated with unemployment among 
total public LMP expenditure may also affect workers’ preferences. Welfare states use ALMPs 
and PLMPs concurrently because a suitable mix of ALMPs and PLMPs – rather than a simple 
increase in ALMP spending – can reduce unemployment (Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Martin, 
2015; Pignatti and Van Belle, 2018). The proportions of expenditures on the two types of LMPs, 
which vary across countries, may influence workers’ perceptions of how balanced the 
relationship between ALMP and PLMP expenditures is at an aggregate level. That is, if a 
country spends less on unemployment benefits vis-à-vis ALMPs, workers may tend to want 
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more welfare rather than job training on a budget. On the other hand, workers in a country, 
which has already invested a large portion of its public expenditure into ALMPs, will likely be 
reluctant to support more public spending for job training and education. Therefore, this study 
formulates its second hypothesis regarding public spending on LMP as follows: 
 
H6: The lower a country’s ratio of PLMP expenditure to total LMP spending, the less 
its workers support the social investment approach which aims to increase job 




To test the above hypotheses, this study analysed a data set combining the ESS Round 8 data 
(2016) and country-level data from Eurostat and OECD statistics. This analysis focused on 
respondents who are in paid work or unemployed and looking for a job, between 15 and 64 
years of age, because this research concerns only the economically active population. The ESS 
Round 8 provides microdata from 21 European countries, but this study examined only 20 
countries, excluding Iceland because suitable count-level variables on the country were 
unavailable. In conducting descriptive and regression analyses, this study applied both 
population and post-stratification weights. The former were calculated by the authors based on 
data about economically active population in each country, while the latter derived from the 
ESS data. 
The dependent variable in this analysis came from the following item in the ESS data: 
‘Now imagine there is a fixed amount of money that can be spent on tackling unemployment. 
Would you be against or in favour of the government spending more on education and training 
programs for the unemployed at the cost of reducing unemployment benefit?’ 
 
This survey item was originally coded with four categorical values (‘strongly against’ 
= 1, ‘against’ = 2, ‘in favour’ = 3, ‘strongly in favour’ = 4), but a new binary variable was 
created in the current study by a recoding (‘strongly in favour or in favour’ = 1, ‘strongly against 
or against’ = 0) which was used as the dependent variable for logistic regression models. To 
determine the effects of different kinds of non-standard employment, the fixed-effects logistic 
models with clustered standard errors and country dummies were examined because they most 
powerfully control for country effects. In assessing the effects of LMP spending, random 
intercept models and random slope models were fit to attain accurate variance estimates of the 
country-level institutional variables. However, due to the limited number of countries, the 
findings from the random-effects models may be technically problematic. Hence, to verify the 
statistical models’ reliability, the two-step approach suggested by Bryan and Jenkins (2016) 
was applied. Furthermore, since welfare states’ institutional features or societal characteristics 
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tend to be highly correlated with each other, multicollinearity can occur between count-level 
variables in regression models. Thus, the current study examined the correlations coefficients 
between the aggregate indicators and their variance inflation factors (VIFs) in multilevel 
logistic models, and the results are presented in Table 1. Public expenditure on vocational 
training and public social expenditure showed the highest degree of correlation, but their 
coefficient is fairly low accounting for 0.544. In addition, the VIFs of all country-level variables 
in the multilevel logistic model – including all individual-level variables – were less than 2. As 
a result, aggregate variables are not highly correlated, and multicollinearity between them is 
deemed not to constitute a threat. 
The individual-level independent variables are four kinds of non-standard employment: 
part-time permanent, part-time temporary, full-time temporary and solo self-employment. Each 
of these variables is operationally defined as follows. First, part-time permanent employment 
is one that involves less than 35 working hours per week based on a permanent employment 
contract. Second, part-time temporary employment is one that involves less than 35 working 
hours per week based on a fixed-term employment contract. Third, full-time temporary 
employment is one that has no less than 35 working hours per week based on a fixed-term 
employment contract. Finally, solo self-employment is self-employment which do not have 
any employee. In addition, the country-level explanatory variables are the public expenditure 
on vocational training as a percentage of GDP and PLMPs’ share of total LMP expenditure in 
2015. The data on these variables were obtained from OECD statistics (OECD, 2020a). 
 The individual-level control variables were selected based on the welfare attitude 
literature. They are as follows: gender (‘male’ = 0, ‘female’ = 1), age (in years), education level 
(five categories: ES-ISCED I or II, IIIb, IIIa, IV, and V1 or V2), the presence of children (‘no 
child at home’ = 0, ‘residing with children’ = 1), public sector employment (‘non-public sector 
job’ = 0, ‘public sector job’ = 1) and attendance at religious services (ranging from ‘never’ = 0 
through to ‘everyday’ = 6). Additionally, to investigate how economic hardship (‘living 
comfortably’ = 1 through to ‘very difficult to live’ = 4) and subjective unemployment risk 
(‘likely to be unemployed during the next 12 months’ = 1, ‘unlikely to be unemployed’ = 0) 
affect the associations between non-standard employment and preferences for the social 
investment approach to unemployment, supplementary models were estimated using these 
variables. 
The country-level control variables in this analysis are averages of public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 2011 to 2015, public spending on education in 2015 
and average unemployment rates from 2011 to 2015.1 Because public social expenditure tends 
to influence the relationship between different country-level variables regarding welfare 
regimes (Jæger, 2006), and because public spending on education is closely associated with 
 
1 Public social expenditure data were obtained from Eurostat (2018), public spending on education 




social investment, this study includes both of these aspects as possible confounders in its 
statistical models. Unemployment rates are also added because the national unemployment rate 
is highly likely to affect opinions regarding LMPs. 
 











Ratio of PLMP 











1 - - - - 1.72 
Ratio of PLMP 
to total LMP 
spending 
0.467  1 - - - 1.86 
Public social 
expenditure 0.544 0.441 1 - - 1.97 
Public spending 
on education 0.373 0.104 0.479 1 - 1.64 
Unemployment 
rate -0.077 0.344 -0.194 -0.420 1 1.67 
Note: The VIFs were calculated based on the logistic model including all individual-level variables. 
 
 
4 Empirical findings 
4.1 Approval ratings for the social investment approach to unemployment 
Table 2 displays different groups of workers’ approval ratings by country. First, two-thirds of 
people in the labour force are found to support the social investment approach. Workers’ 
average approval ratings in the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom are higher than 
80%, whereas the corresponding figures in Lithuania and Spain are 49.2% and 53.1%, 
respectively. Part-time permanent workers’ average approval rating is 71.3%, which is 3.4 
percentage points higher than standard workers’ average approval rating, although the reverse 
tendency appears in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In contrast, the 
proportion of part-time temporary employees who support the social investment approach is 
58.1%, which is even lower than the corresponding figure for standard employees. However, 
notably, Dutch and Portuguese part-time temporary workers show considerably higher 
approval ratings than standard employees in these countries. This study’s findings demonstrate 
that 69.8% of full-time temporary workers support the social investment idea on average. This 
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figure is slightly higher than the corresponding figure for standard workers, but the gaps 
between the two groups vary greatly across countries. Next, the proportion of solo self-
employed workers who are in favour of increasing job training at the cost of unemployment 
benefits is estimated at 69.6%, which is higher than standard workers’ corresponding figure 
yet lower than employers’. However, exceptionally, in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, 
the solo self-employed have noticeably higher approval ratings than employers. Finally, the 
average approval ratings of the unemployed are 59.1%, but a detailed comparison reveals large 
variations across countries. Less than half of the unemployed in 11 of the 20 countries surveyed 
have positive attitudes towards the social investment approach, whereas their corresponding 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Regression findings 
On the basis of the findings from this study’ fixed-effects logistic models, which Table 3 shows, 
the hypotheses associated with the impacts of different types of non-standard employment (H1, 
H2, H3, H4a and H4b) can be tested. According to Model 1, which includes the individual-
level independent and control variables, part-time permanent employment has a significantly 
positive effect while part-time temporary employment is significantly negatively associated 
with preferences towards social investment. Consequently, the results support both H1 (i.e. 
part-time permanent employees are more likely than standard employees to support the social 
investment approach which aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction 
in unemployment benefits) and H2 (i.e. part-time temporary employees are less likely than 
standard employees to support the social investment approach which aims to increase job 
training and education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits). Moreover, part-
time temporary employees are found to be as supportive as the unemployed. On the other hand, 
since this study is unable to identify a significant effect concerning temporary full-time 
employment, H3 (i.e. Full-time temporary employees’ attitudes towards the social investment 
approach which aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction in 
unemployment benefits do not significantly differ from standard employees’ attitudes) is 
rejected. Regarding solo self-employment, the analysis results reveal that the form of 
employment has no significant effect compared to standard employment, which is the reference 
category in Model 1, whereas its coefficient is significantly negative when the reference 
category is self-employment with employees.2 As a result, the results do not support H4a (i.e. 
solo self-employed workers are more likely than standard employees to support the social 
investment approach which aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a reduction 
in unemployment benefits reduction) but do support H4b (i.e. Solo self-employed workers are 
less likely than employers to support the social investment approach which aims to increase 
job training and education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits). 
In addition, models 2, 3 and 4 demonstrate that economic hardship and the subjective 
likelihood of unemployment do not affect the associations between non-standard employment 
and preferences for the social investment policy for unemployment in the assumption of 
budgetary constraints, though workers suffering economic hardship are found to be less likely 
to support such a policy. As expected, all of the models indicate that being an employer has a 
significantly positive effect while being unemployed has a significantly negative effect. Among 
the control variables, age is found to be negatively associated with these preferences while 
frequency of religious attendance is positively related. 
Table 4 illustrates the estimates of the random intercept models, which provide 
evidence to test the study’s hypotheses regarding LMP spending. The full model shows that 
public expenditure on vocational training is significantly negatively associated with individual 
 
2 This study estimated a model in which the reference category is ‘self-employment with employees’, but Table 




preferences for the social investment approach. In addition, it shows that the ratio of PLMP to 
total LMP spending has a significantly positive association. As the methodology section 
mentions, the current study conducted a two-step approach, whose estimates are presented in 
Appendix Table A3. This approach also confirms the country-level findings. Consequently, the 
findings support both H5 (i.e. the lower a country’s expenditure on job training, the more its 
workers support the social investment approach which aims to increase job training and 
education at the cost of a reduction in unemployment benefits) and H6 (i.e. the lower a 
country’s ratio of PLMP expenditure to total LMP spending, the less its workers support the 
social investment approach which aims to increase job training and education at the cost of a 
reduction in unemployment benefits). Because multilevel models with random slopes do not 
make any substantial changes to the random intercept models, the results are not described. 
Additionally, a higher unemployment rate is found to be associated with a negative attitude 
towards the social investment policy in the full model as well as the two-step approach. 
However, the other country-level control variables – public social expenditure and public 




Table 3. Logistic regression on preferences for social investment policy to unemployment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Work type              
 Full-time permanent (standard) Ref.     Ref.    Ref.    Ref.   
 Part-time permanent 1.12 ** (0.036) 1.11 ** (0.034) 1.12 *** (0.033) 1.12 *** (0.032) 
 Part-time temporary 0.58 *** (0.089) 0.59 ** (0.090) 0.59 *** (0.086) 0.60 ** (0.090) 
 Full-time temporary 1.06  (0.084) 1.08  (0.073) 1.08  (0.082) 1.09  (0.077) 
 Solo self-employment 0.99  (0.130) 0.99  (0.134) 1.00  (0.124) 1.00  (0.128) 
 Self-employment with employees 1.27 * (0.123) 1.26 * (0.136) 1.31 ** (0.127) 1.29 * (0.139) 
 Unemployment  0.59 *** (0.045) 0.67 *** (0.070) 0.59 *** (0.048) 0.65 *** (0.080) 
             
 Female 0.88 * (0.053) 0.89  (0.056) 0.89  (0.058) 0.90  (0.061) 
 Age 0.99 ** (0.004) 0.99 ** (0.004) 0.99 ** (0.004) 0.99 ** (0.004) 
 Education               
 ES-ISCED I or II 0.90  (0.116) 0.95  (0.117) 0.89  (0.121) 0.93  (0.121) 
 ES-ISCED IIIb 0.91  (0.077) 0.93  (0.080) 0.91  (0.075) 0.92  (0.078) 
 ES-ISCED IIIa Ref.    Ref.    Ref.    Ref.     
 ES-ISCED IV 1.13  (0.106) 1.14  (0.109) 1.13  (0.109) 1.14  (0.112) 
 ES-ISCED V1 or V2 1.04  (0.076) 1.03  (0.074) 1.03  (0.076) 1.02  (0.073) 
             
 Having children 1.04  (0.028) 1.05  (0.030) 1.04  (0.032) 1.04  (0.033) 
 Religious attendance 1.07 *** (0.013) 1.07 *** (0.013) 1.08 *** (0.014) 1.08 *** (0.014) 
             
 Economic hardship             
 Living comfortably    Ref.      Ref.   
 Coping with living    0.86 * (0.051)    0.86 * (0.051) 
 Difficult to live    0.83  (0.081)    0.85  (0.084) 
 Very difficult to live    0.59 ** (0.090)    0.60 ** (0.106) 
             
 Likelihood of unemployment             0.93  (0.074) 0.96  (0.069) 
     
 Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
 BIC 22,507.9 22,371.8 21,915.8 21,795.7 
 Number of observations 18,643 18,567 18,047 17,987 
 Log Likelihood -11,185.1 -11,677.7 -11,435.7 -11,380.2 
Note: The estimates of country dummy variables are not displayed.   
Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
Odds ratios and robust standard errors (in parentheses). 




Table 4. Random intercept models on preferences for social investment policy to 
unemployment 
 Null model Full model  
Individual-level             
 Work type        
 Full-time permanent full-time (standard)    Ref.   
 Part-time permanent    1.11 ** (0.036) 
 Part-time temporary    0.58 *** (0.089) 
 Full-time temporary    1.06  (0.083) 
 Solo self-employment    0.99  (0.130) 
 Self-employment with employees    1.28 ** (0.121) 
 Unemployment    0.59 *** (0.046) 
        
 Female    0.88 * (0.053) 
 Age    0.99 ** (0.004) 
 Education        
 ES-ISCED I or II    0.90  (0.116) 
 ES-ISCED IIIb    0.90  (0.076) 
 ES-ISCED IIIa    Ref.   
 ES-ISCED IV    1.11  (0.106) 
 ES-ISCED V1 or V2    1.03  (0.075) 
        
 Having children    1.04  (0.029) 
 Religious attendance    1.07 *** (0.013) 
       
Country-level        
Public expenditure on vocational training     0.04 *** (0.019) 
Ratio of PLMP to total LMP spending    6.75 *** (3.222) 
Public social expenditure    1.03  (0.017) 
Public spending on education    1.20  (0.210) 
Unemployment rate    0.95 ** (0.017) 
   
 Variance between countries 0.222 0.073 
   
 BIC 24,340.7 23,302.2 
 Number of observations 19,380 18,643 
 Number of countries 20 20 
 Log Likelihood -12,160.5 -11,557.7 
Ref. = reference category; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
Odds ratios and robust standard errors (in parentheses). 




This study contributes to the recent discussion on public opinion concerning the social 
investment paradigm by analysing the effects of different types of non-standard employment 
and LMP spending on individual workers’ preferences in a budgetary trade-off scenario. 
Multiple studies analyse public opinion towards social investment approaches as alternative 
social policy ideas, but they rarely assume a trade-off between public expenditures on social 
17 
 
investment and social protection. Moreover, there is very little knowledge of the effects of non-
standard employment and institutional LMP factors on preferences for social investment. 
The current study’s key findings are summarised as follows. First, it identifies a stark 
difference between part-time permanent employees and part-time temporary employees in the 
assumption of budgetary constraints. The former group is more likely to support the social 
investment policy for the unemployed, even by accepting unemployment benefit reduction, 
whereas the latter group tend to have less positive attitudes than standard employees. Second, 
part-time temporary employment’s effect is similar to unemployment’s effect. Third, being a 
full-time temporary employee or solo self-employed worker does not affect individual 
preferences. However, solo self-employed workers tend to harbour less favourable attitudes 
towards the social investment policy for the unemployed than employers. Finally, at the country 
level, public spending on job training is negatively associated with support for the social 
investment approach while the ratio of unemployment benefits to total LMP spending is 
positively associated. 
Temporary employment does not itself seem to affect preferences for the social 
investment approach to unemployment in the budgetary trade-off situation. However, this 
study’s analysis reveals that a combination of fixed-term and part-time contracts negatively 
influences these preferences. Because part-time temporary employees face the highest level of 
income insecurity among the groups of non-standard workers, they may have the most negative 
attitudes. Their worries about upcoming economic hardship seem to suppress their vocational 
training needs. Although solo self-employed workers’ attitudes do not differ from standard 
workers’ attitudes, they clearly have different preferences from employers, who show the 
highest level of support. This finding confirms the argument that significant disparities in 
political opinion exist between employers and solo self-employed workers, as Jansen (2019) 
shows. 
 An interesting finding shows that the institutional features related to LMP spending 
influence workers’ attitudes. Since the social investment approach is less popular in countries 
with higher levels of public spending on job training, these countries’ governments appear to 
need to improve the quality of job training programmes in order to increase workers’ support. 
In addition, because workers in countries with relatively small budgets for unemployment 
benefits tend to be less favourable, a large reduction in unemployment benefits would likely 
greatly erode public support for the social investment approach in these countries. 
Nowadays, as the gig economy has rapidly grown, platform workers have received a 
huge amount of attention in the academic and policy fields (Vandaele, 2018). Since they might 
face a high risk of unemployment and, at the same time, highly demand more opportunities for 
vocational training, an exploration of their attitudes towards the social investment approach to 
unemployment is required. However, due to data limitations, the current study is unable to 
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Appendix Table A1. Descriptives of the individual-level variables 
Variable Value N Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 15 - 64 20,466 42.83 0.081 
Employment type 
Full-time permanent 11,546 
19,804 
  
Part-time permanent 2,108   
Part-time temporary 513   
Full-time temporary 1,676   
Solo self-employment 1,399   
self-employment with employees 1,177   





Yes 9,890   
Education 
ES-ISCED I or II 2,929 
20,401 
  
ES-ISCED IIIb 3,862   
ES-ISCED IIIa 4,299   
ES-ISCED IV 3,150   
ES-ISCED V1 or V2 6,161   










Less often 4,249   
Only on special holy days 4,341   
At least once a month 1,909   
Once a week 1,681   
More than once a week 305   
Every day 63   
Economic hardship 
Living comfortably 
on present income 7,256 
20,350 
  
Coping on present income 9,865   
Difficult on present income 2,589   
Very difficult on present income 640   

















Ratio of PLMP 













Austria 0.17% 0.46 29.44% 4.611% 5.22% 
Belgium 0.19% 0.16 29.98% 5.353% 8.02% 
Switzerland 0.11% 0.18 26.96% 4.508% 4.65% 
Czechia 0.12% 0.02 19.88% 3.180% 6.36% 
Germany 0.36% 0.20 28.84% 3.620% 5.21% 
Estonia 0.11% 0.08 15.28% 4.008% 8.91% 
Spain 0.15% 0.11 25.32% 3.506% 23.75% 
Finland 0.15% 0.48 30.72% 5.576% 8.33% 
France 0.25% 0.27 33.94% 4.538% 9.76% 
United Kingdom 0.20% 0.01 28.24% 4.249% 6.97% 
Hungary 0.07% 0.02 20.58% 3.230% 9.35% 
Ireland 0.09% 0.22 21.36% 3.113% 13.26% 
Italy 0.09% 0.17 29.48% 3.349% 11.14% 
Lithuania 0.06% 0.07 15.92% 3.393% 12.07% 
Netherlands 0.24% 0.07 30.36% 4.341% 6.47% 
Norway 0.13% 0.10 25.66% 6.281% 3.51% 
Poland† 0.08% 0.01 19.03% 4.015% 9.31% 
Portugal 0.07% 0.27 26.48% 4.141% 14.15% 
Sweden 0.26% 0.15 29.48% 5.018% 7.84% 
Slovenia 0.08% 0.04 24.34% 3.818% 9.15% 
Mean 0.15% 0.155 25.56% 4.19% 9.17% 
Std. Dev 0.079% 0.136 5.249% 0.864% 4.439% 
† The social expenditure of Poland was calculated based on the data from 2011 to 2014. 
* Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
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Appendix Table A3. Estimates of country-level variables from random intercept 
model and two-step approach 






























Two-step:      
 Step 1 N.A. 









*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Notes: Population and post-stratification weight values were applied to the all models; the two-step 
significance levels refer to critical values from t(14)-distribution; because Step 1 in the two-step 
approach have only individual-level variables, their estimates are not displayed in this table.  
 
 
 
